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CATASTROPHIC DAMAGE FROM DAM-BREAK FLOODS 
I. PROBLEM DEFINITION AND STUDY PURPOSES 
Even as technological advances improve soc ial weI fare, more people are 
exposed to disastrous technological failures. The standard of living in the 
United States is higher than ever before, but our country also stands in 
significant danger of disaster events of far er scope than any previously 
experienced. The flooding that would be caused by the failure of a major dam 
~s one example. 
Asses sment 0 f these low-prob ab i 1 ity/high-consequence event s requires 
quantification of both probabilities and consequences. Considerable work has 
been done on the former (Rowe 1977, Waller and Covello 1984), but relatively 
little attention has been given to estimating the consequences of disasters 
that impact thousands of people. Society has increasing cause to plan against 
a really large disaster event where losses of life may approach millions and 
economic damage may be in billions of dollars. This study may be viewed as an 
exploratory venture in moving from the occupant or building to the community 
and (to a lesser degree) on to the regional scale in damage estimation. 
When a few properties are damaged by flood, fire, or strong wind, the 
repair requirements can be tabulated and used to est imate the loss (whether 
economic or expanded to a more broadly based utility function) to the occupant 
or owner. The risk expectations of individuals and communities, and 
consequent ly most risk reduct ion and risk avoidance programs, are based on 
losses at this scale. 
When thousands of propert ies are damaged, the same tabulation and 
estimating relationships would severely understate the loss to the community. 
The lo'ss from the simultaneous dest ruct ion of 1000s of homes exceeds 1000 
times that from the destruction of just one. The ability of an economy to 
"self insure" by moving resources from individuals who are not impacted to 
those who are limited by repair capac ity and mobi 1 ity constraints. The 
impact has been scaled upwards from the occupant to the community level. 
Exactly what causes this magnification? How large is it? How might one 
estimate the amount to expect from a given catastrophe? What magnification 
magn i tude might one expect from a major dam break? The purpose of th is 
exploratory study is to review historical records on catastrophes and their 
impacts, identify the major impacting processes, and examine the literature on 
these processes in order to: 
1. Conceptual ize the principal processes that could magnify disaster 
losses resulting from a dam-break flood, 
2. Identify indicators to watch in determining which processes wi 11 be 
activated and estimate how much magnification will occur, 
3. Approximate the order of magnitude of magnification likely to be 
caused by the worst conceivable dam break scenario in the United States, 
I 
4. Suggest scal ing studies for quantifying catastrophic loss for water 
resources planning. 
The approach is to probe the spec.i fics of what losses are and how they 
occur during a catastrophe. Past efforts to define catastrophe have largely 
overlooked the dynamics of the interacting processes over the duration of a 
disaster and the changes in these interact ion associated wi th larger scale 
d i sas ters. The goal is to expand from past conceptual i zat ions featuring 
soc ietal recognit ion (Rowe 1977) to a reconnaissance assessment to st imula te 
critical thinking on the processes causing upwards scaling of losses from low 
probability/high-consequence events. Ideas are offered for future study 
rather. than refined for scientific scrutiny. 
II. A FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSMENT 
A. Time frames. Our starting assumption is that the magnification 
largeLy results from dynamic synergistic interaction of disaster impact 
processes. According to our characterization, losses (active impacts) and 
recovery (reactive impacts) occur over time. The event begi.ns with a massive 
negative impact during a relatively short period. Its aftermath is extended 
by positively reinforcing feedback mechanisms (Forrester 1970) over a much 
longer period of continuing deterioration. Recovery begins during the event 
and reduces and eventually eliminates the losses through positively 
reinforcing feedback mechanisms. At the end, the restoration may even improve 
the community. 
The damage occurs as physical, environmental, and social system fail to 
function in their accustomed manner. Losses are summed over a disaster period 
from the beginning of the event until the completion of the recovery. The 
individual losses stem from lost income or lost utility with respect to 
environmental or social values within this disaster period. Where justified, 
they can be ameliorated by repair or restoration (should the property be 
beyond repair) investments. The negative dynamic interactions add to the 
losses or constrain the recovery during the disaster period. The positive 
interactions work in the opposite direction. 
B. Scaling. Impact magnification is analogous to scale effects in 
physics, meteorology, and hydrology in that the same principles can be applied 
for a better understanding of the upward sc al ing of socio-economic impacts. 
In physics, for example, subatomic, atomic, pore, basin, continental, and 
planetary studies address different processes. Soc io-economic ally, the 
processes to consider in estimating the losses from not being able to use and 
the costs for repairing a damaged bui Lding are inappropriate for estimating 
the. cost of J;"estoring a devastated city. Whether one is dealing with physical 
or socio-economic systems, 
1. The operational forces and interactions vary with scale. 
Atmospheric circulation occurs at molecular, 'storm, and frontal scales. 
People experience events as individuals and as members of communities, 
regions, and nations. Economic interactions concentrate in defined trade 
areas. 
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2. Activity at smaller and at larger scales have consequences at the 
scale of primary interest. For example in estimating catastrophic loss 
to a community, one must consider building repair costs at the property 
scale and the state of the economy at the regional scale. 
While the term "magnification" is introduced as a multiplier, the full 
concept is for it to be a generic term that describes the increase in unit 
losses as one goes from a disaster to a catastrophe without implying that the 
losses are uniformly larger. Some types of losses may decrease or disappear. 
Others become larger. Processes that did not even exist at a smaller scale 
emerge and then begin to dominate at a larger scale. 
Experience in the physical world suggests that larger scale processes are 
slower and continue over a longer time period. For example, physics tells us 
that processes occurring at large spatial scales take long per lods atom 
movements are in units shorter than microseconds and stars hardly change their 
positions in millennia. [n fact, the time dimension is useful in classifying 
factors contributing to catastrophic or super catastrophic losses. Also, at 
these larger scales, the longer time frames cause the dynam ic feedback 
mechanisms to extend further into the future, become associated with greater 
uncertainties, and have a greater spread in the probability distribution of 
the potential impacts. 
During larger scale events, losses and repairs move into different 
frameworks. Business and government communities are "damaged" in different 
sorts of ways than are buildings; their failure to function properly inflicts 
different sorts of losses, and they require different repair "measures." 
Additional interactions must be considered in assessing the effects on 
regional, state, and national economies and politics. 
C. Definitions. 
est a b 1 Ls h s om e bas i c 
offered: 
[n order 
terms of 
to examine 
reference. 
loss "magnification," one must 
The following terminology is 
1. Disaster. The dictionary definition of a disaster is "any sudden 
unfortunate event." This study focuses on dam-break events. However, 
because dam-break catastrophes are rare (only 12 11 fe-taking events in 
the United States since l870), other "natural" disasters were also 
examined to add to the data base. For this purpose, a natural disaster 
is defined as one originating in natural sources as opposed to one caused 
by people, accidentally or purposefully. 
2. Dam-break. An event in which the failure or overtopping of a dam 
passes a large volume of water downstream and produces a severe flood. 
This study focuses on dam breaks associated with major hydrologic 
events. The large areas impacted by heavy rains are likely to give 
hydrologic dam-breaks larger magnification than structural dam breaks. 
3. Damage. The dictionary definition of damage is "injury or harm 
that impairs value or usefulness." As now generally accepted in water 
resources planning (Water Resources Council 1980), value will be examined 
in three dimensions: 
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a. Economic (measurable in monetary units), 
b. Social (measurable in changes in the social 
particularly in the physical and mental health of 
that cannot be fully expressed in monetary units). 
well-being and 
people in ways 
c. Environmental (measurable in changes to natural 
biologic or geologic] systems in ways that cannot be fully 
in monetary units). 
[chiefly 
expressed 
4 . Cat as t r 0 ph e • Th e d i c t ion a r y de fi nit ion 0 f cat a s t ro phe is 
"widespread disaster." This study makes that de finit ion quant i tat ively 
specific by interpreting Ilwidespread ll as an event large enough for 
damages to magni fy beyond linear addit ion because addit ional processes 
occur at the community scale. 
5. Super catast rophe. An event large enough for catastrophic 
damages to magnify beyond linear addition because still additional 
processes occur at a still larger regional scale. 
6. Normal damage. The damage a disaster causes from a property-
scale per.spective can be estimated from the losses associated with 
impaired use and the costs of implemented repair or replacement to better 
meet occupant needs. One can use unit costs to estimate the damages to 
each property and sum the results to obtain a total "normal damage." 
7. Magni fied damage. Once an event crosses the threshold from a 
disaster to a catastrophe, the actual total damage exceeds the sum of the 
normal damages and can be called a "magnified damage." The community-
scale perspective would add losses associated with: 
a. Impaired community functions and the costs of reducing the 
impairment and restoring the functions. 
b. Magnification of "normal" losses and repair costs because of the 
impaired community functions. 
8. Property Scale. 
first order perspective 
ownership, or some other 
social dimensions. 
Assessment of the impacts of a disaster from the 
of an individual, a property under single 
unit of equivalent size in the environmental and 
9. Community Scale. Assessment of the impacts of a catastrophe from 
the second order perspective of a larger community. 
10. Regional Scale. Assessment of the impacts of a super 
catastrophe from a third order regional perspective. 
10. Scaling Threshold. The disaster size at which magnification 
begins. This size varies with the type of damage and is much larger in 
going from the community to the regional scale than in going from the 
property to the community scale. Threshold magnitudes must be determined 
empirically. 
11. Magni ficat ion. The transform used to convert an es t imate of 
normal or property-scale damage to magnified or community-scale damage. 
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Simplistically, one could define "magnified damage ll divided by "normal 
damage" as the magnification factor. Realistically, the transform is 
more complex. 
12. Super Magnification. The transform used to convert an estimate 
of community-scale damage to regional-scale damage. 
13. Severity. The dictionary definition of severity is "harshness." 
As applied in this study, severity is a scaler measure of dam-break 
flooding harshness that can be used in estimating normal damage (loss at 
the property scale). 
14. Severity factors. Factors used to estimate severity. The 
factors commonly used for estimating flood damages are the depth and area 
of floodi.ng, the value and kinds of property at risk, the suddenness of 
the event, and flood velocity, sediment content, and duration. 
15. Property-scale occupancy. Normal flood damage is estimated by 
integrat i ng spat ially-distributed informat ion on severity factors over 
spatially-distributed information on flood-plain occupancy. At the 
property scale, this information would be descriptions and values of 
properties by flood-plain location. 
16. Synergism. The diet ionary defin i t ion of synerg 1sm 1S "working 
together cooperatively." As applied in this study, synergism encompasses 
interactions among property-scale and community-scale processes. 
11. Synergistic factors (Scaling indices). Factors used to index 
whether larger scale impacts will occur and the amount of magnification. 
Specific factors may be physical, economic, social, or environmental. 
They are found in propert i es of the event averaged over community-scale 
areas. 
18. Community-scale occupancy. Magnified flood damage would be 
estimated by integrating information on synergistic factors over 
descriptive information on community juxtaposition with respect to the 
hazard. At the community scale, occupancy information includes 
descriptions of community land use, the distribution of community service 
hubs with respect to the hazard, and the spatial distribution of the 
communication and transportation systems. 
19. Regional synergism. At the higher scaling boundary, regional 
synergism encompasses interactions among community-scale and regional-
scale processes. 
20. Regional synergistic factors (Regional scaling indices>. 
Factors used to index whether regional-scale impacts occur and the amount 
of consequent magnification. Specific factors are found in properties of 
the event averaged over regional-scale areas. 
21. Regional-scale occupancy. Super magni fied flood damage would 
be estimated by integrating information on regional synergist ic factors 
over descriptive information on the juxtaposition of the hazard within 
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the region. This information would cover regional size, the distribution 
of reg i ona 1 func t ions, and regional communicat ion and tr ansportati on 
systems. 
D. Damage Classification. Damages defined as impairments in achieving 
goats are appropriately classified by goal. The Principles and Standards 
(~vater Resources Council 1980) provide the goal c1assificat ion most widely 
recognized for water resources planning and which contains the following ten 
economic, environmental, and social goals: 
Economic Domain. 
Gl: Economic Value. Beneficial and adverse impacts that can be 
fairly measured in monetary units. 
Environmental Domain. 
G2: Ecologic Value. Impacts on populations of species that can be 
predicted from biological interrelationships and whose worth depends 
on the role of those species in the total environment. 
G3: Aesthetic Value. Impacts on views, sounds, and scents 
perceived by humans that can be predicted from physical, chemical, 
and biological relationships and whose worth depends on the 
preferences of the people affected. 
G4: Historic Value. Impacts on historical, cultural, or religious 
sites that can be predicted from juxtapositions between impacts and 
sites and whose worth depends on the values people, now and in the 
future, place on the sites. 
G5: Scientific Value. Impacts on areas that are being or can be 
used for scientific studies because of their special features or 
long record of collected data that can be predicted from juxtapo-
sitions between impacts and sites and whose worth depends on the 
values science, now and in the future, places on the sites. 
G6: Pristine value. Impacts on opportunities for people to 
experience settings that are essentially unaltered by human activity 
and that can be predicted from juxtapositions between impacts and 
sites and whose worth depends on the values people, now and in the 
future, place on the sites. 
Social Domain. 
G7: Real Incomes. Adjustments to account for exchanges of goods 
and services that do not invo lve money and for di fferences in the 
utility of money among peoples of different income or different life 
styles. 
G8: Health. Impacts on mental and physical health and safety and 
measured in numbers of people motivated to greater achievement or 
harmed, classified by degrees. 
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G9: Educational Opportunities. Impacts on the educational, 
cultural, and recreational opportun1t~es for the population of a 
region and measured in numbers of people helped or deprived, 
classified by degrees. 
GIO: Emergency Preparedness. 
operat ions and on evacuat ions in 
types of interference, classified 
Impacts on military and police 
civil emergencies and measured in 
by degrees. 
E. Indirect Impacts. Many interactive and long-term impacts cannot be 
neatly classified among these goals defined for property-scale analysis. An 
alternative approach to their examination would be to consider how a major dam 
failure would i.mpact the engineeri.ng, financial, environmental, social, 
political, and legal feasibility of subsequent water resources projects and 
related public works. For example, a major failure could cause: 
1. Technically unnecessary engineering design standards that make 
all dams more costly. 
2. Greater difficulty tn funding, whether by taxes or through 
financial markets, perceived "hazardouslt facilities. At a time when 
Federal agencies are moving toward joint financ ing, the difficult ies in 
establish ing innovat iva fund ing consort ia wi 11 increase. Water proj ect 
services will deteriorate. 
3. Politicians to become tess likely to support dam projects, as has 
happened to nuclear power, and perhaps, at the super catastrophe scale, 
efforts to abolish water resources construction agencies altogether. 
This would force essential water resources development and management 
activity back to a more expensive local responsibility. 
4. Laws that restrain dam building, directly or by excessive 
bureaucratic regulation, or that assign so much liability that few are 
willing to take the risk. 
III. HISTORICAL DESCRIPTIONS AND TOPIC REVIEWS 
Empirical observations of historical natural catastrophes were used as a 
starting source of information for identifying magnification effects. 
Contemporary records and later descri pt ions 0 f nat ura 1 catas t rophes and 
assessments of what went on from a scientific perspective were searched for 
indications of the nature and magnitude of scale effects. 
A. Criteria for event review. 
1. Emphasis was placed on catastrophes that have occurred in 
recent years in order to have a reasonable match with present 
technological and socioeconomic conditions. 
2. Emphasis was placed on catastrophes in the United States. 
Catastrophes abroad were considered in locations expected to have 
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similar socioeconomic impacts because of similar cultural, economic, 
and transportation settings. 
3. The rev iews 0 f dam- fa i 1 ure events looked at both the 
physical impacts and the consequences growing out of those impacts. 
Other kinds of disasters were examined for information useful in 
understanding. 
B. Selected historical events. Following the above criteria, data were 
collected describing the following events: 
1. Historical disasters in the United States not associated 
with dambreaks: 
a. Galveston, Texas, hurricane, September 8, 1900. 
b. The San Franc isco, California, earthquake and fire, April 
18, 1906. 
c. Hurricane Camille, Mississippi Coast, Aug. 17-18, 1969. 
d. Hurricane Agnes, June 19-29, 1972. 
e. Regional floods and debris flows, San Francisco Bay area, 
Cali fornia, January, 1982. 
2. The historical dambreak floods since t870 1.n the Uni ted 
States that were severe enough to cause loss of life were: 
a. May 16, 1874; Mill River, MA, 143 deaths. 
b. May 31, 1889; Johnstown, PA, 2209 deaths. 
c. Feb 22, 1890; Walnut Grove, AZ, 150 deaths. 
d. Sep 30, 1911; Austin, PA, 80 deaths. 
e. Jan 27, 1916; Lower Otay, CA, 30 deaths. 
f. Mar 12, 1928; St. Francis, CA, 450 deaths. 
g. Dec 14, 1963; Baldwin Hills, CA, 5 deaths. 
h. Feb 26, 1972 ; Buffalo Creek, W, 125 deaths. 
1. Jun 9, 1972 ; Rapid City, SD, 237 deaths. 
j. Feb 22, 1976; Bearwallow, NC, 5 deaths. 
k. Jun 5, 1976; Teton, ID, 14 deaths. 
1. Nov 6, 1977 ; Taccoa Falls, GA, 39 deaths. 
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about 3500 lives were lost 1n these 12 events (Baldewicz 
The dambreaks at Johnstown, St. Francis, Buffalo Creek, and 
described in Appendix I. 
Al together, 
1984, p. 83 ). 
Rapid City are 
3. The historical events overseas covered were: 
a. Flash river flood, Lynmouth, England, August 15, 1952. 
b. Floods in Bristol, England, July II, 1970. 
c. Australian floods (Lismore NSW and Brisbane) of 1974. 
These events were selected because descriptions by social scientists or 
historians provided useful insights to understanding "community-scale" flood 
damage. 
In format ion from the hi storical records on the 12 selected events is 
summarized in Appendix I in chronological order of event occurrence. The 
journalistic accounts suggest what the people in the impacted communities 
considered important. The accounts of congressional efforts on behal f of 
constituents and in debating disaster relief policy suggest what politicians 
and government officials consider important. Author comments (impressions) 
are added within the Appendix and developed within the text to follow. 
C. Criteria for topic review. Many of the concepts developed 1n the 
body of this report and observation from the historical records in Appendix I 
suggested literature searches for work that others have done on noted or 
related topics. These were pursued in accordance with their relevance and 
central ity to the magnificat ion processes seen originally or introduced by 
considerations that came to light during the review of the historical events. 
D. Selected review topics. Appendix rr abstracts information gleaned 
from SCholarly articles, trade journals. and other literature. The topics 
searched were: 
1. Dam safety. 
2. Rebuilding and relocation. 
3. Repair cost escalation. 
4. Health impacts. 
5. Psychological impacts. 
6. Preventative response. 
7. Disaster planning by businesses. 
8. Areal extent .of probable maX1mum precipitation. 
IV. PROCESS-RELEVANT INFORMATION 
The disaster period was defined above as having three stages. For a dam 
failure example, the initial impact results as a wall of water roars down the 
floodplain to bring sudden destruction. An aftermath of economic, 
environmental, and social interactions add losses in amounts that diminish 
over time. Recovery processes heal the wounds. gradually at first but picking 
up momentum over time. Impact, aftermath and recovery processes interact in 
magnifying disaster loss to catastrophic dimensions. 
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The synergism seems to be largely a scale effect associated with discrete 
boundaries as events cross thresholds that change process contexts and 
interactive dynamics on a time scale. Starting from this hypothesis, the 
fo 11 owing structure was used to 1 ist processes occurring at the property 
scale, note how those processes are affected by larger scale impacts, and 
describe the new processes that emerge. 
Processes Operating at the Property Scale 
1. Health. Disasters take lives, cause injuries, and spread disease. 
Injuries are concentrated during the event and continue in lesser numbers (as 
the result of induced accidents or losses of safety) through the aftermath and 
recovery per iod s. Disease may be spread by cold and exposure, the spread ing 
of hazardous materials and vectors, or drinking water contamination. Deaths 
may be caused by either injury or disease; immediately or gradually. Recovery 
involves rescue of the trapped or isolated, conveyance to places of warmth and 
safety, and treatment to prevent death and speed recovery to good health. 
The physical and psychological shock effect of a quick and unexpected 
experience on the body's central nervous system reduces human ability to 
function. The lasting effect of this trauma adds to the losses as victims 
fail to care for themselves during the aftermath and are less effective in 
their recovery efforts. The accounts of the Lynmouth flood (Append ix I) 
describe numerous trauma situations and illustrate some of their impacts. 
All of the historical accounts used deaths as the lead statist ic in 
describing catastrophes. Health concerns, associated with contamination of 
the drinking water and the spread of toxic or disease-laden materials, were 
also publicized. Study is needed to determine how the publicity works to 
inspire desirable publ ic caution or to feed fear and add to irrat ional 
behavior. 
Reported interviews during the aftermath period showed the most severe 
lingering health problem to be the long term impacts of catastrophe 
experiences and their consequenc.es on mental heal th. The losses were 
intensified by breakdowns in rescue and health services and the depressing 
effects of losing social support and a familiar physical environment. 
positive health effects occur during the recovery period. A period of 
major change opens many opportunities that feed optimism and good health. For 
example, widespread devastation inspired creative reconstruction in San 
Francisco in 1906 and Lynmouth in 1952. 
2. Economic. Disasters damage property and disrupt income from land and 
capital investments. Cleanup delays add to the deterioration. Individuals 
with damaged property may do the best they can in the circumstances, restore 
the property to its original condition, or replace the property in a way 
better suited to changing needs or more commensurate with the revealed hazard. 
Journalistic accounts generally estimated losses as a cost to restore or 
substitute for lost physical facilities and expressed them in either dollars 
or as a percentage of building value destroyed, absolute and relative measures 
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respectively. Looting, charlatan help, and reneging Insurance companies were 
noted as adding to the economic loss. 
3. Personal. The sudden destruction of a disaster deprives people of 
many items of personal value that cannot be replaced through the market place. 
Other items have known or market approximated values but are not replaceable. 
Still others may be replaceable but beyond the means of the loser. Examples 
listed in journalistic accounts included table china, diaries, and ledgers of 
uncollected bills. These losses are less publicized than the first two in 
contemporary accounts, but they are probably greater than many people indicate 
publicly. Second to human beings, item of particular personal value generally 
become the focus of evacuation and rescue activity. 
Magnification of Property-Scale Losses by Community-Scale Processes 
1. Health. Health losses are increased by interferences with rescue and 
the efficient delivery of preventative and recuperative health services. 
Corrnnunication and transport interruptions (or disruptions by converging 
spectators) may delay bringing trained people and special equipment to the 
disaster scene. Victims are forced to rely on poorly equipped or poorly 
trained people. Rescue shifts from targeted searches for known people to 
massive scouting over large areas for cries for help or nameless bodies. The 
delivery of massive health services is more impersonal and further from the 
supporting roles of family and friends and thus more depressing to victims who 
are left less able to make the mental adjustments required for speedy 
recovery. 
2. Economic loss. Aftermath events add to the cost of repair response to 
catastrophe by interference and delay and thus force people into a longer 
period of coping that also adds to their losses. Retrospective studies 
estimate numbers of lost jobs, a loss that is seldom reported in the news 
accounts because of the difficulty in compiling statistics quiCkly. 
3. Personal loss. Aftermath processes also interfere with the rescue of 
personal property and consequently add to this loss. The magnification may be 
greater here because the search and repair wi 11 often only be done by the 
losers themselves, other activities may demand their time, and they may feel 
unduly stressed by restrictions to their doing so. 
Processes Operating at the Community Scale 
1. Community Health. Communities, as well as individuals, are 
characterized by a state of well-being that suffers after major external 
insults. After a catastrophe, a community (take a person who has lost his 
health) would devote more time and resources to recovery and function less 
satisfactorily in normal activities. Market processes may have to be 
reestablished. Inventories may be destroyed; labor arrangements may be 
disrupted; and new business enterprises may have to be established. Everyone 
benefiting from those services would suffer. 
2. Community Economics. 
the capital investment 1.n 
Community economies also experience damage to 
their infrastructure. Losses are due to less 
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efficient operation during the aft ermath and recovery per iod s. Repair 
(perhaps by recruiting replacement capability from outside) is required. 
3. Community Loss. As a third part of this analogy, communities 
experience loss of things their citizens value collectively. In San 
Francisco, civic pride suffered with the destruction of "some of the finest 
buildings in the city." The city, as a place visited, personally or 
vicariously, lost identifiers of its character that could never be replaced. 
"The heart and guts of one of the world's best loved cities were 
gone" (Bronson 1959, p. 83). Some mentioned items were art collections, 
landmark buildings, and businesses that at tracted cl ientele from throughout 
California. At the community scale, the process involved sudden damage, 
continuing loss as the city changed during restoration, and a recovery as a 
new civic pride grew around the reconstructed city. 
Vital and land records were destroyed at city hall in San Francisco. !fA 
thousand tales remain untold. Conflicts in documentation, and there are many, 
sprang from the fact that a single reporter was physically unable to see more 
than a tiny part of what transpired" (Bronson 1959). The press responded to 
public interest in how the rich and famous were affected by the disaster, 
Enrico Caruso in San Francisco. Human interest stories were also common. For 
example, six babies were delivered along Market Street in doorways or beneath 
the trees during the day of the fire in San Francisco. 
Additional Processes Observed in San Francisco 
The 1906 San Francisco earthquake and fire was by most measures the most 
severe catastrophe that the United States has experienced this century. The 
following processes, observed during that disaster period, provide a base for 
the impact analysis to follow. 
1. Personal hardship was expressed in numbers of homeless, losses of and 
deprivations of basic services such as electricity, water supply, markets for 
purchasing daily needs, sanitation, etc. Conflicts arose between official 
efforts to effect orderly occupancy to supply these needs in refugee camps and 
individual preferences for greater independence by living in scattered shanty 
towns. 
2. Communication breakdown. The interruption of communications with the 
outside and within the area of impact reduces the ability of relief efforts to 
concentrate on the right problems and causes tension for family and friends 
1 iving elsewhere and want ing reports. It restricts the informat ion base 
available for personal planning by the victims. Within the isolated disaster 
area, wild rumors begin to spread. 
3. Transportation breakdown. 
frustrate the conveyance of essential 
flight of outward bound refugees. 
Transportation stoppages and delays, 
food and supplies into the city and the 
4. Loss of basic infrastructure: water, electricity, health services. 
Stopping the use of home plumbing and circulating instructions on digging and 
maintaining latrine trenches. 
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5. Disruption of special care facilities. Inability to provide normal 
care for the incapacitated or the incarcerated, the aged or the infirm. 
Hospitals, prisons, insane asylums, and nursing homes have people who cannot 
be cared for temporarily or who escape and harm themselves or others. 
6. Relocations in different time frames. The general catastrophe 
scenario is first for people to flee to a place of safety, then to collect 
more slowly in places of temporary shelter (standards for comfort increase 
with the durat ion of stay), and finally to reestablish themselves either at 
their original location or elsewhere. In San Franc i sco, trans por tat ion 
breakdowns interfered mostly with getting into and out of the city. With a 
population of 400,000 left homeless; 300,000 fled the city and about 70,000 of 
these never returned. 
7. Vulnerability. A primary mental health problem was that of 
individuals surviving the primary event being left "nervous" enough to be 
traumatized by imagined precursors of repetition. The terror of reoccurrence 
generates positive feedback loops that adds to subsequent losses. Irrational 
action can be triggered by minor events. 
8. Crime. Fear of looting, hope of being spared at the last moment, and 
efforts to save valued possessions prevented flight until the last possible 
moment, and added to the congestion during movement to places of personal 
safety. A common practice is to bring in the army to provide Eor the safety 
of the community, announce sti ff penalties (shoot looters on sight), and 
gradually return responsibility to local officials. 
9. rnsurance concerns. Some insurance companies treated their San 
Francisco obligations with contempt. Three European companies denied refused 
to pay and withdrew from doing business in the United States. Three others 
settled after arbitrary percentage discounts to all claims. 
10.- Charlatans. Some vendors took financial advantage of desperate needs 
(lack of customer protection while law enforcement personnel are diverted 
elsewhere). Water was sold by the glass. rn San Francisco, draymen who had 
charged $2 per day charged $75 to help people move their goods the day after 
the earthquake. 
11. Health. The San Francisco experience was that the general health of 
the City was vastly better in the months following the fire compared to what 
it had been before (Bronson 1959, p. 125). Physically, 
a. Many sickly left town. 
b. Fresh air and exercise for all. 
c. Liquor banned. 
Mentally, new opportunities were created for people of vision to make a new 
city. 
12. Expressions of desire to rebuild a better place. This could be as an 
investment or as an advertisement for venture capital. "We want to be part of 
the big boom the new San Francisco will have. We believe it will be a better 
and greater city than ever.1I "Like a powerful catalyst, the conflagration 
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quickened the detail of human experience. Simple acts of kindness were framed 
forever in the City's memory." new friendships. There remained " •• the organi-
zation of a great city, including the apparatus of government and business, 
families, traditions, reputations, credits, and established relations with the 
rest of the world." 
13. Corruption. The greed of corrupt officials and the San Francisco 
City Hall grew. Property owners paid under the counter for permits and 
inspections. Top officials were convicted and sent to prison. "Its 
housecleaning was as thorough as its physical cleaning by fire. A new clean 
government came to power" (Bronson 1959, p. 180). 
V. PROCESS ANALYSIS. 
The above evidence leaves no doubt that economic, environmental, and 
social values are magnified at property, community, and regional scales. 
The descriptive information in the appendices gave a good starting point for 
examining synergistic interactions and hypothesizing magnification processes. 
The process analysis sought guidelines for defining thresholds between 
scales. These vary among the goals. An environmental super catastrophe may 
be only a mild economic disaster. The threshold depends on the size of the 
interact ion arena with respect to the goal. For example, economic man 
interacts in the market place, species interact in habitat units, and people 
interact in social groups. Consequently, a threshold depends on impact 
magnitude relative to the relevant arena. 
A. Classification. The reasonable starting assumption is that different 
types of damage vary greatly in propensity to magnification; consequently, one 
must know the types of damage occurring in order to make a reasonable 
magnificat ion est imate. Orderly assessment requires a damage taxonomy that 
can be used to identify locations whose seating effects are important. One 
can then systematically review damage types, explore processes, and 
approximate amounts of magnification. This section presents a trial taxonomy 
and then uses it to structure the following process analysis. 
The taxonomy begins with the economic, environmental, and social, values 
expressed in goals Gl through GIO. Other dimensions with potentially 
significant influences on impact are: 
1. Property type: homes, industrial or commercial buildings, 
landscaping, agriculture, public and critical facilities, and hazardous 
materials are distinguished because of differences in the made and 
urgency of repair. 
2. Property ownership: public, private, or 
dist inguished because of di fferences in values served 
available for restoration. 
3. Response approach: 
corporate are 
and resources 
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a. Restorat ion (more common for the a ffl uen t) . The owner who 
repairs his property to a pre-catastrophe condition or replaces it 
in kind judges that the value retrieved justifies the cost. 
b. Replacement (more common after larger events). Some owners 
replace damaged or destroyed property with a different design as an 
altogether different use than was there before. 
c. Coping (more common for the poor). Other afflicted simply do the 
best they can in their circumstances because they cannot or do not 
find repair worthwhile. Here the damages are the costs of coping and 
other losses found in G2 through G10. 
4. Indirect (technological external effects) and secondary 
(pecuniary external effects) impacts. 
B. Analysis of Processes 1n the Economic Domain. 
Gl: Economic Value. 
The flood wave resulting from dam failure causes massive destruction. 
Pate-Cornell and Tagaras (1986) used damage ratios estimating destruction of 
90 percent of the property on the path of the wave and 10 to 15 percent in 
inundated backwater areas. Refinement of the analysis to map the severity 
factors and property-scale occupancy would give more reliable results. 
A catastrophic dam break above a laterally confined floodplain would 
cause almost total destruction in the path of the flood wave at the property 
scale. Lesser losses would occur in tributary backwaters and after wave 
dissipation downstream. At the community scale, the damage ratio would depend 
on community juxtaposition within the floodplain but would be unlikely to 
approach 90 percent. Consequently, one tends to be deal ing with complete 
destruction at the property scale and partial loss at the larger scales. 
Where the destruct ion is complete, losses encompass the costs of 
relocation to a new site, the extra cost of temporary occupancy of the less 
favored location, restoration of the destroyed property, and return. Where 
the destruction is partial, the loss covers the costs of coping with the 
impaired functioning and repair. All of these costs may be increased by 
aftermath interferences. 
The impairment may be worsened by deterioration during the aftermath 
period. Rapid salvage can recover some lost items, rapid cleanup stops the 
deterioration and thereby reduces repair cost, and rapid repair reduces lost 
value from property investment. Capac i ties for c.leanup and repa ir are 
themselves impaired by the event and overloaded by the work to be done. The 
overload causes the demand to exceed the supply and raises costs. Capacities 
may be augmented by emergency help (but emergency help is notoriously 
inefficient) and are gradually restored as firms are reestablished and the 
backlog dwindles. 
Income losses are important for agriculture and business, but most damage 
estimates are based on the purchase of repair services or replacement items in 
the market. Economists place a normative val ue on market prices where the 
transactions are too small to exert influence. However, a major catastrophe 
places a sudden demand that may exceed normal market transactions over a 
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period of several years while simultaneously greatly reducing the capacity of 
suppliers to respond. 
Some sort of dynamic economic model would be required to predict prices 
and assign normative values in this situation. Certain production segments 
may experience temporary large product ion reduct ions, and transport systems 
may not be able to make up the difference through importation. Baecher, Pate, 
and de Neufville (1980) suggest input-output analysis in the dam-break context 
for assessing intersect oral impacts (the secondary effects of losses in one 
production sector on others), but available models will not be reliable where 
the disaster is large enough to alter the matrix coefficients. Furthermore, 
the analysis would have to be on a time scale much shorter and with much 
greater market instability and uncertainty than assumed for most economic 
models. 
Specifically, disasters add demand for repair and replacement items and 
reduce the ability of suppliers to provide them. The scale dimension to watch 
in determining whether to expect magnification would be the capacity of the 
suppliers serving the victims relative to the demand triggered by the event. 
Assessment is complicated by the variety of relevant capacities. 
For example, economic loss is magnified by factors inhibiting rapid 
salvage of items that would otherwise become lost and rapid cleanup of 
possessions that would deteriorate while buried in mud and water or otherwise 
exposed to the elements. Cleanup delays add substantially to repair cost for 
damaged propert ies. Cleanup requires access to spec ial supplies, but the 
labor is generally not handled through market processes. The labor cost can 
largely be considered a loss in "real income ll and will be considered more in 
that section. 
The principal process observed as causing repair cost magnification was 
the insufficient capacity of the regional construction industry to undertake 
the desired repair. Donations and relief measures help but are seldom 
efficiently directed. The impact may be reduced by importing workers at added 
cost. Individuals pay premium prices for quicker repair, added magnification 
occurs because the premium prices entice charlatans installing shoddy 
materials with inexperienced labor as well as crooks extract ing payment but 
doing little if any work. The cost of second "repairs" adds to the loss. 
Probably the best data source for examining additional processes during 
super catastrophes at the regional scale is the San Francisco earthquake and 
fire. That event generated a national relief program, vast refugee camps, 
massive resettlement of the working class into nearby cities, and housing 
reconstruction for over 500,000 people. While construction, communication, 
and -transportation systems have advanced greatly over the last 80 years and 
the sparse numerical data cannot be used directly, the situation provides a 
reasonable starting point for conjecturing how similar devastation would be 
handled today. 
Part of the rationale used for employing risk analysis in the economic 
evaluation of large public projects is that the collective risk aversion 
approaches zero for losses shared among large numbers of people (Baecher, 
Pate, and de Neufville 1980). However, even thought many people are impacted 
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at the property scale, few connnun1tles are involved. One must consider risk 
aversion at the community scale as contributing to damage magnification. 
A rich literature has recently been developing on applying the 
"cont ingent eval uat ion method" using quest ionna ires and reI ated percept ion 
probing to estimate willingness to pay for items that are not directly 
evaluated by market processes (Curmnings, Brooksh ire, and Schu lze 1986). For 
example, Brookshire, Eubanks, and Sorg (1986) conclude their assessment of 
application of the concept to environmental evaluations by doubting its 
reasonableness because expres sed envi ronmen tal go al s con fl ic t wi th the 
assumptions of economic efficiency. An even larger limitation to application 
to environmental and social catastrophic impacts is that it relies on 
percept ions where the popu lat ion at risk is poorly informed on the physical 
consequences of a major dam failure. One way, however, to address this 
difficulty would be to develop a computerized graphical display capability 
that can effectively convey dam-break flood hazard. 
Process Review: Yancey et al. (1976) examined data on repair costs 
following a number of disasters and found magnification where the total 
damage exceeded the annual construction volume within an Economic Area 
defined by the Bureau of Economic Analysis but not in cases experiencing 
lesser damages. The largest quantified magnification was fourfold 1n 
Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, following Hurricane Agnes when the ratio of 
normal repair cost to annual construction capacity reached 9.1. 
The Yancey index gives two important dimensions for measuring capacity ln 
the economic domain; a spacial dimension defined by the size of 
economic trade area and a time dimension of one year. In this ratio, 
economic trade area scales the community in wh ich people interac t 
buying and selling goods and services. The year is an approximation 
an 
the 
1n 
of 
the maximum acceptable repair period. It is also the time unit used to 
report personal and business incomes. 
In addition, the Yancey index provides a basis for hypothesizing 
thresholds for the other goals. Specifically, one can hypothesize that 
the threshold to use in going from the individual scale to the community 
scale should be based the domain in which individuals interact relative 
to the goal at hand. The index would then be the ratio of the impact of 
to the period of time required for the disturbed domain to effect 
recovery. 
The magnification of econom1C loss 1S also important for financial 
(insurance) planning because of the impact on budgeting (settling 
claims). The benefits to be achieved by reducing magnificat ion suggest 
additional possibilities for relief programs: after a catastrophe, 
victims would gain substantially from programs to sustain the delivery of 
goods and services at normal prices (prevent pr ice gouging). Programs 
prov id ing free repa ir (where government must 0 ften ab sorb very large 
price gouging) have become counter product ive because they do not have 
price as either an allocation vehicle or as an incentive to consurmnate 
delivery. Programs for brokering repair services (providing information 
on vendors and costs) and facilitating the movement of temporary repair 
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capacity into an area (whether governmental or industrial) should also be 
given greater attention. 
The above analysis deals with repa~rlng to restore a property to meet the 
income-generating and personal needs of an owner or manager. When one 
scales upward to the community level, one enters the domain of repairing 
to restore the ability of local business and government to serve public 
and civil needs. The repairs should restore facilities, replenish 
stockpiles, reestablish communications among buyers and sellers, and 
reinstate transport systems for goods and people. Civil needs encompass 
cultural and recreational items. Catastrophic damages encompass the 
costs of restoration and the losses suffered through market 
inefficiencies during the recovery period. 
Occasionally, the destruction may be so large as to necessitate the 
replanning and reconstruct ion of large urban areas. This changes the 
mode from the relatively expensive repair of individual properties to 
mass construction and offers the potentials of a better planned 
community, more modern (disaster resistant) design, and urban renewal. 
However, dambreaks are too rare for flood proofing investment against 
reoccurrences to have much economic value. 
Property Type. Magni fication can be expected to vary great ly among 
property types because they differ in the activities involved in repair 
or replacement and the activities vary in the market factors influencing 
cost escalation. The analysis by Yancey et al. (1976) concentrated on 
buildings. Building repair magnification is probably greatest for 
residences and small commercial buildings where the owners have least 
experience in procuring least-cost help repair markets. The repair of 
larger buildings requires specialized equipment (probably drawing from a 
larger economic area) handled by owners with special resources. 
Agricultural and landscaping damages are probably less subject to magni-
fication as owners either suffer losses or delay repairs. Infrastructure 
repair cost escalation is tied to the in-house repair capacity of the 
concerned utilities and mounts when local entities must contract with 
external sources. The costs of emergency repair of critical facilities 
or protect ing the pub I ic against hazardous materials are part icularl y 
magnification -prone because quick action is required in a framework 
where cost is no object. 
Responding Institution. Individuals, public entItles, and companies vary 
greatly in their repair resources. Individuals are probably the most 
dependent on local markets, and large corporations are the most likely 
to draw resources from other locations. Public entlt~es can usually 
obtain help from state and federal governments when events reach catas-
trophic proport ions (but may feel pressured by the long time lags 
involved). The socially disadvantaged may be poorly informed as to help 
alternatives and needlessly do the work on their own. 
Response Mode. Greater pressure for quick return magnifies the economic 
losses because repair is forced before the market can develop new 
channels to supply necessary goods and services. The replacement mode 
works to reduce costs because of the economics of mass construction and 
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the advantages of more efficient design. Cases where victims cope with 
the losses have little economic magnification, but their social 
magnification may be quite large because of the burden placed on the poor 
and socially disadvantaged. 
Indirect Impacts. Dealing with the losses caused by catastrophe detract 
from productive activities. The users of output from the local economy 
experience losses, delays, and higher prices. The largest indirect 
impacts are probably associated with firms withdrawing from business and 
local governments discontinuing services. After Agnes, one Pennsylvania 
community advertised to attract replacement businesses. 
Followup. The magnificat ion and higher-sc ale processes out lined above 
are important enough to deserve research attention. Some topics that 
should be particularly pursued are: 
a. More precise estimation of construction capacity by activity 
type. 
b. Inventory and analysis of impacts at the community scale 
requiring restoration. 
c. Analysis of urban renewal experiences as a guide toward 
efficient community restoration. 
Analysis of Processes in the Environmental Domain. 
G2: Ecological Value. 
One may question the existence of ecological damage on the grounds that 
floods, as fires, are recognized by ecologists as having a Ifcleansingll value. 
Dambreak floods, however, occur at sizes, times, and places that nature cannot 
produce. Ecological loss has been indexed (James et a1. 1978) by the time 
period required for natural recovery to pre-event posltlons. One would 
definitely expect scaling magnification of the recovery period as destruction 
areas increase from scattered plants and animals (replaced rapidly), to 
habitats' (taking years to restore), to species (beyond restoration). For 
threshold scaling, the spacial dimension would be relative to the geographical 
area occupied by a habitat, and the time dimension would relate to the 
duration of flooding required for a given habitat to be destroyed. One would 
only expert large ecologic magnification in ecologic areas positioned to be 
entirely disturbed by the flood. 
Process Review. The above construct of economic loss can be integrated 
with general environmental information as a starting point for assessing 
the effect of catastrophe on loss in environmental value. A disaster may 
cause massive ecological disturbance. Aftermath and recovery processes 
are largely biological. Analogy with the economic domain leads one to 
hypothesize that environmental magnification occurs when local 
environments are disturbed to a point where important spec ies mus t 
migrate back from a distance. This conceptualization requires 
measurement of the extent of a habitat in terms of the area of easy 
species movement and interaction. 
Environments, like market areas tend to organize in "seLf-contained" 
units. Swamp, riverine, and alpine environments are examples. When the 
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ecological disturbance is surrounded by its parent "uni t, II recovery 
should be relatively rapid (albeit variable with the type of unit and the 
extent of the disturbance just as economic repair costs). When the 
disturbance alters the entire unit beyond its ready restoration capacity, 
higher scale processes come to the fore. 
Annual cycles probably pertain to species as well as economies 
be.;ause of the periodic ity of the seasons. The ecological momentum 0 f 
destructive processes through an aftermath period deserves further study. 
Recovery could be speeded by enhancing known contributors on the critical 
path toward ecological recovery. 
Species Type. Recovery time varies over the impacted species and the 
interdependenc s among them. The greatest magnification would occur 
with rare or endangered spec ies, because they both draw from a smaller 
replenishing resource and the factors causing their numbers to diminish 
also slow recovery. 
Responding Institutions. Natural environments recover through natural 
processes, but these can be enhanced or delayed by human intervention. 
The modern world also contains many imported species in "gardens" that 
must be carefully maintained to survive. A catastrophe would interrupt 
maintenance of these entities. 
Response Mode. Natural biological processes doubt lessly vary in their 
res i lience after disrupt ion. They could be analyzed for important 
differences should a case arise where the issue deserves the research 
effort. 
Indirect Impacts. The catastrophe diverts human effort from 
environmental maintenance, and reconstruct ion activity may cause 
environmental harm during the reconstruction period. Species not 
directly impacted by the flood could be affected indirectly through their 
food chains. 
Followup. While these relationships contain inter.esting aspects, losses 
in ecological and other environmental values were given less attention in 
this study because of the a prior judgment of lesser importance as dam-
break consequences. Ecological impacts are probably small except in 
local situations with specific problems. Any future studies should 
identify and concentrate on these. 
G3: Aesthetic Value. 
A catastrophe inflicts tremendous aesthetic loss. Reconstruction 
activity could add to aesthetic disturbance during the aftermath period. 
Aesthet ic recovery would occur as reconstruct ion is completed and vegetat ion 
returns. 
Process Review. Magnification would be associated with slower recovery 
when the devastation is more widespread. It would be reduced to the 
degree that collective personal preference begins to accept the changes 
in appearance. One would expect the scal ing dimension to be related to 
the area that can be seen by eye from vista points. 
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Attraction Type. Attractions can be ranked aesthetically with the most 
attractive being the most vulnerable to damage and the least attractive 
being cases where removal would be an aesthetic gain. 
Responding Institutions. Property owners who are particularly slow to 
repair damages property or landscaping may leave aesthetically 
displeasing reminders of past disasters. 
Response Mode. Both human restoration and natural processes work to the 
aesthetics of damaged areas. 
Indirect Impacts. Aesthetic disturbances may became a sign of urban 
blight or, worse yet, generate adverse reaction psychologically in people 
who associate them with unpleasant memories. 
Followup. The effects identified above seem too small, compared with 
other losses, to devote much attention to estimating scale effects on the 
aesthetic damages from dam-break catastrophes. However, the psycho-
logical impacts of aesthetic deterioration is one topic that may deserve 
some study. 
G4: Historic Value. 
Individual sites of great historic, cultural, or religious value could be 
ruined by a major flood. One would not expect nonlinearity in summing losses 
over multiple sites. Magnification, however, may be more important when 
considering the impacts of losses of non-replaceable historic, cultural, or 
religious attributes of sites on the well-being of the community. 
Process Review. Catastrophic conditions could have an important impact 
in preventing recovery and cleanup of salvageable items after a disaster. 
One reason why historic loss magnification is probably not important is 
that a restoration can reestablish general public satisfaction as was 
found in Europe after World War II. 
Site Type. Historic value is concentrated in a few properties which 
become honored by antiquity or associations with particular events. The 
potential for loss magnification is probably tied to the relative 
importance of artifacts and the inter.ference that catastrophe would pose 
for their recovery. 
Responding Institutions. Sites of particular historical value are 
generally either owned by a public agency or historic foundation. A 
catastrophe is likely to pose many other restoration costs to these 
entities. A greater popular urgency for many of them may delay 
restoration activity for the historic sites and add to their loss. An 
offsetting factor may be that major losses may have sufficient national 
interest to be covered through financial appeals. 
Response Mode. Restoration to original conditions requires specially 
trained labor, and obtaining it may cause signi ficant delays. However, 
the more relaxed time frame should further reduce any magnification 
effect. 
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Indirect Impacts. Major historic sites have particular attraction to 
some individuals who in turn feel a major loss. The long term loss to 
future generations of lost contact with their heritage may be 
particularly important. In another dimension, tourism could be adversely 
affected. 
Followup. Nevertheless, as an initial judgment call, this goal is 
probably of lesser importance for this study. The magnification of 
historic damages does not deserve further study other than for the 
possible goal of ident ifying and watching part icularl y noteworthy site s 
in hazard areas. 
GS: Scientific Value. 
Scientific loss would be caused by the destruction of data sources, 
experimentation, and information of scientific value. 
Process Review. Neither scientific loss nor its magnification was 
mentioned in the popular descriptions of any of the cases reviewed. In 
some cases, a catastrophe could destroy major stashes of information of 
lasting scientific value, but losses to study areas or scientific 
equipment are seldom significant. On the other side, observations of 
catastrophe have important values, both scientifically and through their 
contribution to reducing future losses. 
Site Type. Scientific value is concentrated in a few storehouses of rare 
information. Each is unique, and unique sites have less magnification 
potential. One would, however, store such items out of risk areas. 
Responding Institutions. Scientific work is largely performed by corpor-
ations, governmental research units, and universities. All these 
institutions could suffer financial and personnel impacts that slow 
cleanup and restoration. 
Response Mode. The normal immediate response mode would be to reorganize 
scattered informat ion and restore experimental areas to the degree 
possible. Society may lose by being deprived of valuable knowledge, but 
this impact is generally small. 
Indirect Impacts. Any loss or delay ~n application of important 
scientific information has ripple effects on potential users throughout 
society. Corporations could potentially suffer a major blow in product 
development. These impacts would be important were there evidence of 
significant losses. 
Followup. Since scientific activity involves worldwide interaction, 
disruptions must be at a very large scale, and scientific damages were 
judged not to merit immediate further study. 
G6: Pristine value. 
A dambreak would scar a pristine environment; however, pristine 
environments are already altered by flow regulation below dams. Consequently, 
one would scarcely expect this goal to be important here. 
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Process Review. Officially-declared wilderness areas are unlikely below 
major dams. Individual s may consider certain smaller areas as pristine 
and derive the enjoyment value from them that others attach to 
wilderness. The loss of a pristine are would not be recoverable and thus 
not subject to magnification. 
Site Type. Pristine areas vary considerably, and their differences 
should be considered in assessing the loss caused by catastrophe. 
Responding Institutions. Responsible organizations may become involved 
in protecting pristine areas from further deterioration or attempt to 
restore impacted areas. These efforts could also be impaired by events 
reaching catastrophic scale. 
Response Mode. 
deteriorat ion and 
attributes counter 
The response combines protection from further 
bearing the loss. The long time lags and the unique 
any magnification. 
Indirect Impacts. The primary loss lies in the meditative and recreative 
values of pristine areas. 
Followp. Several potential impacts are noted above, but further study 
is not judged warranted for any of them. . 
D. Analysis of Processes in the Social Domain. 
G7: Real Incomes. 
Disasters impact people in many ways not covered in monetary value, and 
the magnitude of these losses led this study to devote considerable effort to 
identify and classify losses that people feel keenly. Secondly, people vary 
considerably in ability to cope with catastrophe. The literature records 
correla~ions with income and sex. The poor place greater reliance on social 
resources in coping whereas the wealthy depend more on economic resources. 
The poor worry more about job losses, and the rich more about business losses. 
Where the social resources are important, the seal ing would be expected to 
depend on the size of the impacted area relative to the area occupied by the 
reinforcing social community. 
Process Review. The case studies showed a wide variety of losses in 
real, as opposed to monetary, income. These were classified among 
disturbance of social reinforcing, interruption of personal time, 
unpleasant personal experiences, loss of community services, and loss of 
personal property. Losses in these six classifications involves 
distinctive processes as outlined below. 
Social reinforcement contributes to human mental well-being by the 
support and presence of family, friends, and other kindred spirits giving 
help and fellowship. A large event separates people from these social 
resources. The aftermath period is one of growing fear and perhaps 
substantive information that key relationships will never be restored. 
Recovery occurs with the restoration of original relationships or tl}e 
establishment of substitutionary ones. Social reinforcing takes place 1n 
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several dimensions (family, neighborhood, and organ izat ional memberships) 
and at several levels (local and regional). Quantification is very 
difficult, but the impacts of losing social reinforcement are believed 
subject to intense magnification because the important r.elationships can 
be confined to a small region that can suffer very severe impact (e.g. 
Buffalo Creek). Consequently, a smaller event can reach catastrophe 
classification. 
Time interrupti.ons provide a second major component of personal 
loss. Countless hours are spent in flight, making temporary arrangements 
for work and living, cleaning and restoring damaged property, and 
countless other unfamiliar and disturbing activities. The burden is 
particularly felt by busy people, even when people can be hired to do the 
manual work. This loss is also subject to major magnificat ion because 
larger events scales spread people over larger areas and greatly 
compl icate the arrangements. Frustrat ions add aggravat ion and can harm 
health in severe cases. Recovery occurs with the restoration of 
comfortable activity patterns. 
Third, the many unpleasant experiences people suffer during a 
disaster event have many short and long term sequences that cannot be 
assigned a monetary value. These can have either phys ical or mental 
causes. The former can stem from exhausting over-activity and exposure 
to dampness and cold during the event and the physical discomforts of 
living in makeshift facilities afterwards. The mental anguish grows out 
of the shock of seeing possessions lost, homes destroyed, and the injury 
or death of friends and family. During the aftermath period, people 
relive their experiences over and over. Opportunities for conversations 
may gradually build therapeut ic effects. These losses are also subject 
to severe magnification because physical and mental experiences largely 
relate to the area within walking distance of one's home. People who are 
temporarily visiting the impact area or have just moved into it probably 
feel less mental anguish. 
The fourth identified loss in real income occurs as people lose the 
accustomed continuous ready availability of electricity, phones, streets, 
water and sewer, libraries, etc. They suffer when these are not 
available. Again magnification begins at a small scale, but probably 
larger than a local neighborhood. People do not mind nearly so much when 
their phone is out and they can walk across the street and use a 
neighbors as they do when all the phones are out. Aftermath effects 
occur as a consequence of people going to extra expense or suffering 
losses during the period of di sconnected services. Recovery generally 
comes quickly after services are restored. Magnification comes as larger 
. events extend the period of service interruption. 
Fifth and finally, personal losses are important because many people 
view the loss of personal treasures and records that have little value to 
others as the largest damage that they suffer. Possessions are generally 
of unique value to specific individuals. Consequently, their loss is 
probably not subject to S1 gni ficant magnification beyond their add i tive 
value. However larger scale events can separate individuals from their 
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possessions for larger periods and cause added loss by reducing recovery 
percentages. 
Social Group. A second component of the analysis required to est imate 
losses in real income is to examine the distribution of these five 
classes of losses among social groups. The magnifications will depend 
on how the various losses are distributed among people with different 
coping capabilities and how the event and its aftermath have underlined 
the capability. Groupings are by income, sex, ethnic group, and social 
contacts. The literature, both experimental and scientific, show most 
of the five classes of loses listed above to vary with social grouping, 
closely knit local communit ies are part icularl y sens i t ive to socia 1 
disruption. People with a wider variety of contacts are in a stronger 
position. 
The loss of time seems most important to the particularly busy. In 
contrast, the poorer and less educated feel greater discomfort or even 
trauma at having to deal with unfamiliar situations without many of the 
coping mechanisms available to the more affluent. Consequently, the dis-
advantaged are more intimidated by the repair process. On the other 
hand, the middle and upper classes probably feel the loss of services and 
personal property more intensely; but they are better able to recover by 
going elsewhere or finding substitutes. 
Respond ing Inst itut ions. Governmental, char itab Ie, re 1 igious, and 
fraternal organizations provide a great deal of support to help people 
during the aftermath and with the recovery from catastrophes. 
Communities face intense pressure from the catastrophe-induced demand for 
emergency services and temporary support functions. Simultaneously they 
face large expenditures in restoring basic services at a time when their 
own losses may have crippled their effectiveness. The nongovernmental 
institutions vary greatly in effectiveness. They work best in helping 
people with whom they were more closely identified before the event and 
generally suffer from acting more in response to outside perceptions than 
real local needs. Many of these activities are delayed by larger scale 
events to augment losses. 
Response Mode. People establish new contacts for social reinforcement 
needs. They have few ways to salvage lost time and continue to feel the 
pressures for an extended period. Unpleasantness and personal losses 
probably harm morale and reduce the will to recover. Community services 
are repaired as quickly as possible with the cost being aggravated by the 
demands for additional help. 
Indirect Impacts. The burdens that people feel personally detract from 
their ability to function. At the community scale, the event reduces 
institutional ability for effective performance and compounds the 
problems as disturbed people become a larger percentage of a community's 
population. The effects at both scales impact many people that were not 
harmed directly. 
Followup. Of the ten goals, real income losses probably have the largest 
magn1.f1.cation and the amount would be particularly large where the 
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geographical area occupied by the community is small and concentrated in 
the floodplain. Real income impacts are the least studied but probably 
account for the most severe flood damage magnification. A great deal of 
attention should be given to studies to understand these processes and 
their impacts better. Specific priority research topics include: 
a. Longitudinal recording and assessment of the five identified 
impact processes. 
b. Clinical examination of the capabilities of various social 
groups to coping with losses. 
c. Longitudinal study of community-scale performance i providing 
goods and services. both those commonly del ivered by the pub 1 ic 
sector and the food and shelter more commonly purchased in the 
market place. 
d. Hypothetical assessment of how these performance indicators may 
operate at the regional scale. 
e. Studies to develop reI ief programs that more effectively meet 
basic identified needs. 
f. Development of programs providing psychological treatment for 
risk groups who are less able to cope. 
G8: Health. 
Loss of life and health is the most publicized impact of catastrophe and 
another one expected to. have a major scale effect. A community can absorb a 
few deaths more easily than the loss of large segments of its population. The 
loss of life may be increased when the number injuries exceed the treatment 
capacity of local health services. Living through a catastrophe impacts 
mental health. 
The flood wave resulting from dam failure can take large numbers of 
lives. Pate-Cornell and Tagaras (1986) used a casualty ratio estimating the 
loss of 50 percent of the population in the path of a flood wave such as the 
which occurred below the sudden failure of Malpasset Dam in France in 1959 
when no warning was possible. 
Process Review. The headlines generated by natural catastrophes 
emphasize loss of life and numbers of people injured. Floods have an 
added health impact because they occur in inclement weather. expose 
people to the cold and wet. and cause many to become ill. Protection of 
life and health is the primary objective of emergency teams during major 
events. 
The catastrophic events leaves many dead, injured. or trapped at 
locations requiring rescue. During the aftermath period. lingering 
threats to heath are found in contaminated water supplies and toxic 
materials carried into living areas by the floodwater. Some noted 
problems included raw sewage, hazardous chemicals. and insects. 
Local health officials should continue their emergency activities until 
these situations have been rectified. However, this sustained capacity 
to operate on an emergency basis may be lacking, particularly when many 
of the required activities are outside the comfort area of the employees. 
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The added pressures and consequent exhaustion may add to the health 
problems of this group. 
However, records 
best in people. 
results achieved 
strong beneficial 
a Iso show a strong 
The challenge and 
by extra effort is 
efforts. 
counter force that br i ngs out 
the sense of helping through 
a positive morale builder and 
the 
the 
has 
The principle used in assessing damage cost magnification also seems to 
apply to health losses; however, the size of the health-care region and 
the time scale used to index capac ity are both smaller than the market 
areas used in damage analysis. Hospital service areas are much smaller 
than the BEA regions, and the time period for ini t ial treatment is no 
more than a few days. Both compressions would add to magnification. 
Fortunately, severe tests of community health care capacity are rare, but 
a more thorough search of the literature may uncover useful information. 
The pub li shed report s on disaster-impacted areas suggest consequent 
mental illness to be as widespread and as severe as physical problems. 
Obv ious ly, catastrophe experiences generate cons iderab le trauma among 
survivors. Memories may bring intense guilt at not having saved someone 
or something or otherwise acted more rationally during the emergency. 
This hypothesis is reinforced by records of damages magnified by 
irrational actions. 
Fear lingers in the hearts of people who have experienced the trauma (and 
aftermath) of a major disaster. The ability of a community to act 
effectively is reduced by irrational fears. Lesser fears can be expected 
among people living downstream from other dams. Any exodus would trigger 
economic deter iorat ion. These effect s have been noted at the community 
and regional scales after major wars. At the national scale, such fears 
would hamper the entire water resources program. 
Social The primary criterion for dividing people among social 
groups respect to analyzing health impacts is differences in 
susceptibility to death or physical or mental illness. Certainly, age 
and general health prior to the event are important. Income and other 
social attributes may affect propensity to secure professional attention 
and proper medication. 
Responding Institutions. Public, private and philanthropic rescue 
activities are widespread after a major disaster. Their primary goal is 
to reduce the loss of life and quickly provide people with medical 
attention to minimize adverse effects on their heal th. Rescue is also 
capacity limited, but the capacity can be significantly increased through 
emergency preparedness efforts. As a disaster moves into the community-
scale, increasing interference and inefficiencies in this mobilization 
adds to the losses. These aspects of catastrophe deserve more attention. 
Health care also encompasses treating people during and immediately after 
the event and continuing services, particularly in the mental health 
area, for sometime afterwards. 
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Response Mode. People unable to obtain health care when needed may 
suffer lingering or even permanent effects. 
Indirect Impacts. People whose health suffers are a productivity minus 
that lasts for a long time both as it affects individuals made less 
productive. Also the burden on health care facilities renders people in 
the community with ailments unrelated to the disaster receive worse 
serv1.ce. 
Followup. The impacts of catastrophe on mental health are particulary 
deserving of further attention. Other studies are needed to pursue 
health care capacity, the impacts of its limitations, and how it can be 
most effectively augmented on an emergency basis. 
G9: Educational Opportunities. 
Educational and recreational opportunities would certainly be interrupted 
by a catastrophe, but no descriptions of the historical events showed the 
impacts to be either a major or subject to significant magnification. 
Process Review. Provisions can be made for both activities on a 
temporary basis after a catastrophe. At the regional scale, a super 
catastrophe may begin to cause significant educational impacts. 
Social Group. Less mobile social groups would feel these losses more 
strongly. 
Responding Institutions. A burden would be placed on the community to 
restore these facilities, but the time frame would not be so demanding as 
to cause a major cost escalation problem. Public schools, governmental 
recreation facilities, private schools, and privately-owned entertainment 
centers would all be impacted to varying degrees. 
Response Mode. The community normally acts to restore basic educational 
facilities quickly. People can improvise with respect to recreation, and 
this has not been noted to cause a problem. 
Indirect Impacts. Minor. 
Followup. After a dam break flood, schools would be closed, and 
recreational activities would be altered. However, quick recovery would 
generally occur. The losses are not anticipated as a major factor in 
magnification. Little reason was uncovered to give priority to studying 
this aspect further • 
. GIO: Emergency Preparedness. 
For this study, the catastrophe is the emergency requlrlng preparedness 
and police protection. One could examine the impact of one disaster on the 
ability of the community to cope with additional ones (simultaneous 
earthquakes, wars, etc.); however, these joint probabilities are low. A 
catastrophe necessitates the immediate police problems of protecting property 
from looting and maintaining order among crowds who may become desperate for 
food and shelter. Emergency preparedness also covers evacuation, temporary 
shelter, and orderly return. One suspects that these needs are not met 
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efficiently during catastrophes and that these needs multiply as one goes to 
larger events. 
Process Review. Prompt emergency action by local officials to deal with 
catastrophe can substantially reduce losses of life, economic damage, and 
adverse social impacts. People expect direct help during the event as 
we 11 as protection of their personal safety and property during the 
aftermath period when they lose control over their personal "territory." 
However, looting (whether by hungry people looking for food or criminals 
stealing for profit) has generally not been as common as people feared. 
The capacity of a community to provide emergency comes first. Warning 
and evacuation systems may become nonfunctional during major 
catastrophes. Over a longer period, shelter, services, and jobs must be 
found or people will move away to find the necessities of life. Forced 
moves are traumatic situations and become more so for a socially self-
contained community or should the relocation become permanent. 
Dams are overtopped by major hydrologic events. A meteorological event 
large enough to overtop a dam will probably cause prior widespread 
flooding below. Evacuation routes may be flooded before they are needed. 
Depth-area-duration curves can be used to examine the extent of such 
storms and plan emergency actions in the context of likely interference 
from simultaneous events. 
Quickly assembled emergency help is notoriously inefficient. They don't 
know what to do and may alienate the local population by their ineptness 
and attitude. A larger problem Lies in the fact that catastrophes are 
too rare for really experienced people to be active. A larger event adds 
to the number of people to be directed, and the added congestion becomes 
a considerable magnification factor. 
Social Group. All soc ial groups become more or less equal dud ng the 
period of flight before pending catastrophe. The primary differences 
would be in recovery time where groups with more money or better contacts 
come out ahead. 
Responding Institutions. A catastrophe places a sudden large burden on a 
wide variety of local governments and corporate and organizational 
entities. Many individuals prefer to go it alone and resent outside 
interference. Where an agency's response capacity is exceeded, it will 
have trouble acting effectively and could add to rather than reduce the 
losses. 
Response Mode. The normal response is to quickly mobilize a program of 
rescue, supervised flight, temporary food and shelter, and repair 
assistance. One suspects that the capacity of the typical system is 
small, and that magnification of losses caused by performance 
inefficiencies begins with a fairly small event. 
Indirect Impacts. Many people are harmed by the mass of fleeing refuges. 
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Followup. Study is needed for improving the effectiveness of emergency 
response. Most communities below major dams have a general program. They 
are unlikely to be specific enough to function well during a moderately 
sized disaster; and one can particularly doubt their effectiveness during 
a really large event. Many of the above descriptions give good advice on 
improving them. 
VI. FIRST APPROXIMATIONS OF MAGNIFICATION MAGNITUDE 
A. Principal Processes. Based on the above analysis, nine principal 
process arenas were selected as generating damage magnificat ion (Table 1). 
The amount of loss growing out of that damage is determined as people choice 
between an active response to restore prior conditions and or passive 
acceptance and suffering losses over time. Certain choice determinants are 
hypothesized on Table 1 as determining whether a person responds actively or 
passively. The introduction of connnunity-scale impacts depends on the size 
and juxtaposi t ion of the disaster event and a measure of impac t within that 
cormnunity. Judgments on these factors with respect to the 9 identified 
processes are listed on Table 1. The processes in all nine arenas operate in 
event, aftermath, and recovery time frames. 
The interactions within and among these arenas may be represented by 
positively and negatively reinforcing feedback loops. Sorting out and 
quant i fying these processes and simulat ing the ir collec t i ve impacts would 
require a research effort far beyond the scope of this study. 
B. Magnification by a "Worst-Case" Scenario. If one orders the degrees of 
catastrophe in terms of deaths, Ayaswamy et al. (1974) estimate that 200,000 
fatalities could result from a dam break failure is in the order of 1000 times 
the number caused by Hurricane Agnes (less than 200) or any other natural 
disaster ever experienced in the Uni ted States. Pate-Corne 11 and Tagaras 
(l986) reports the Auburn Folsom-South Central Valley Project review as 
stating that the collapse of a full Auburn Dam would· imperil the 1 ives of 
750,000 persons in Sacramento. Such an event would far surpass all the 
catastrophes reported in the historical data and introduce interactions at the 
larger regional scales. 
The scale effect of moving from personal interactions to community market 
and social interactions (given the above assessment that the environmental 
interactions are of relatively lesser importance) would be followed by 
movement into far reaching impacts on the economy, institutions, and politics. 
We can, at this point, only speculate on the impacts of an "Agnes Scale" 
catastrophe and then a "Super Dam Failure Catastrophe." Nine principal 
magnification processes are outlined on Table 1. The active sub-processes 
under each heading during impact, aftermath, and recovery, are outlined in 
Table 2. Hypothetical consequences of expansions to larger scales are listed 
~n Tab le 3. 
McCann et al. (1985) provide an approximate method for mapping the 
severity of flooding that would be caused by a dam break flood and estimating 
economic loss and the loss of life. While the scope of this project did not 
Table 1. Hypothesized characterization of principal processes contributing to damage magnification. 
Process 
1. Disruption of 
repair and 
replacement 
capabi lity 
2. Disruption of 
support from 
social group 
3. Disruption of 
personal time 
4. Exposure to 
disturbing 
experiences 
5. Disruption of 
basic community 
infrastructure 
6. Loss of personal 
property 
Active Response 
Repair cost 
escalated 
Cost of community 
reestab lishment 
Hiring special 
help 
Flight. isolation 
Cost escalated 
reprovision. 
emergency and 
long term 
Salvage substi-
tution or re-
plicat ion 
Passive 
Response 
Prolonged 
coping 
Prolonged 
coping 
Prolonged 
coping 
Shock 
recovery 
Community 
coping 
Pining 
Choice 
Determinant 
Income. time 
advers ion 
Cohesiveness. 
leadership 
I nc orne. a b i lit y • 
free time 
Mobility 
Revenues 
. adversion 
Imagination and 
resilience 
Commun ity Un i t 
Economic 
trade area 
Gross residential 
area for soc ial 
group 
Local serVlce 
area 
Residential 
territory 
Utility serVIce 
area 
Residential 
terri tory 
Impact 
Measure 
Annual con-
struction 
capacity 
Percentage 
moved outside 
gross area 
Monthly ser-
vice capacity 
Percentage 
afflicted 
Annual repair 
capacity 
Completeness 
of destruct ion 
W 
I-' 
Table 1. Continued. 
Process 
7. Disruption of 
health care 
services 
8. Deterioration of 
mental health 
9. Inefficiencies 
in emergency 
services 
Act i ve Response 
Cost escalated 
reprovision, 
emergency and 
long term 
Professional 
treatment 
Planned program 
impr.ovement 
Passive 
Response 
Transport 
elsewhere. 
communi.ty 
coping 
Prolonged 
coping 
Delayed 
help 
Choice 
Determ inan t 
Revenues 
Income 
Fam il y support 
Revenues 
Exper t i se 
Community Uni t 
Hospital service 
area 
Impact 
Measure 
Da ily treat-
ment capacity 
Gross residential Monthly treat-
area for social ment capacity 
group 
Political entity Da ily service 
capac i ty 
W 
N 
Table 2. Hypothesized time frame expansions for principal magnification processes. 
Process 
1. Disruption of 
repair and 
replacement 
capability 
2. Disruption of 
support from 
social group 
3. Disruption of 
personal time 
4. Exposure to 
disturbing 
experiences 
S. Disruption of 
basic community 
infrastructure 
6. Loss of personal 
property 
7. Disruption of 
health care 
services 
8. Deterioration of 
mental health 
9. Inefficiencies 
in emergency 
services 
Impa~t 
Equipment destruction 
Labor disruption 
Transport interruption 
Death and illness 
Group scatter 
Activity diversion 
Scenes witnessed 
Separat ion from 
loved ones 
Disrupted services 
Destruction or loss 
of personal effects 
Harm to facilities 
Injuries requiring 
treatment 
Fears growing out 
of scenes and 
separations 
Disturbed preparations 
Interfering inclement 
weather 
Aftermath 
Deterioration during 
restoration delays 
Enticement of poorly 
qual i fied 
Lingering illnesses 
Mental disorientation 
Managemen t time 
Poor decisions 
Absence from work 
Extra cost and worse 
service from temporary 
fac ili ties 
Additional loss or deterior-
ation pending reestablishment 
Extra cost and worse service 
from temporary facilities 
Treatment for lingering cases 
Continuing mental illness 
Reinforcement by more bad 
experiences 
Inefficiencies in community 
shelter and restoration 
services throughout dis-
rupt ion period 
Recovery 
Equipment replacement 
Labor reorganization 
Transport restoration 
Capacity importation 
Group restoration 
Establishment of a new 
group 
Problem solution 
Health restoration 
Restoration of normal 
service 
Psychological sub-
stitution, Physical 
repl ication 
Facility restoration 
Return to normal 
community health 
Return to normal 
mental health 
Restoration of normal 
services 
VJ 
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Table 3. Hypothesized scale expansions for principal magnification processes. 
Process 
1. Disruption of 
repair and 
replacement 
capability 
2. Disruption of 
support from 
social group 
3. Disruption of 
personal time 
4. Exposure to 
disturbing 
experiences 
5. Disruption of 
basic community 
infrastructure 
6. Loss of personal 
property 
7. Disruption of 
health care 
services 
8. Deterioration of 
ment al hea lth 
9. Inefficienc ies 
in emergency 
serVlces 
Personal Scale 
Building and grounds 
damage 
Isolation from social 
group, personal injury 
Mandatory personal time 
commitments 
Personal encounters 
Loss of community 
serVlces 
Heirloom loss 
Loss of health 
services 
Mental disturbance 
Missing or inefficient 
help 
Commun ity Scale 
Disruption of local 
economy 
Scatter of social 
group 
Mandatory activities 
for community employees 
Community failures to 
supply basic needs 
Loss of utility 
facilities 
Disruption of sub-
stitution opportunity 
Loss of health 
facilities 
Loss of work efficiency 
Disruption by refugees 
Regional Scale 
Disruption of regional 
economy 
Disruption of social 
organization at the 
scale 
Management of regional 
recovery programs 
Regional failures to 
support communities 
Breakdown of regional 
communication and trans-
portation 
Large groups losing 
cultural ties 
Loss of regional health 
care capacity 
Loss of regional spirit and 
character 
Massive resettlement 
patterns w 
.po 
35 
permit quantitative estimation, their approach would provide an excellent 
starting point for applying the magnification factors to follow. 
A dambreak flood with about the same direct impact that Hurricane Agnes 
had on the Wilkes-Barre region of Pennsylvania, would cause a community-scale 
magnification of "Increased Cost of Repair or Replacement" of about 4.0. The 
amount could be substantially larger in other areas of the country or for 
different configurations or timing of the impact ing event. The magn i Hcat ion 
with respect to the other eight factors would depend on the disaster size and 
its relative impact on the unit. The nine processes contributing to damage 
magnification as outlined in Table 1, the sub-processes continuing through the 
aftermath and recovery periods as outlined in Table 2, and the expansions into 
larger scales suggested in Table 3 provide a gross basis for approximat ing 
. orders of magnitude for potential magnification. 
The magnifications to be expected from a catastrophe with respect to the 
nine factors would depend on the dynamic interactions during the aftermath and 
the capacity of the community to commence recovery. Quantification could be 
in terms of a threshold where magni ficat ion begins and the amount of 
magnification per unit increase in event size. New thresholds and 
magnification coefficients would be introduced by a super catastrophe. Since 
magnification is defined as a multiple of the normal loss, the coefficient 
would be larger for cases where the "normal loss base" is smaller. These 
considerat ions were used to make the approximations of the magn i fic at ion 
potential for the "worst-case scenario," a super catastrophe taking 
approximately 200,000 lives, shown in Table 4. 
The following considerations were used in making the assessments shown in 
Table 4: 
1. Agnes provided the starting point for judgments on the 
magnification factors placed on this table. A magnification of economic 
loss slightly larger than that experienced by Agnes is used because of the 
larger magnitude of the "Worst Case Scenario ," The large capacity of the 
United States economy would place an upper bound to scaling with respect 
to economic impact. 
2. The Pennsylvania social communities impacted by Agnes extended up 
the hill sides out of the flood plain and thus were not disrupted to the 
extent found at Buffalo Creek. A dambreak flood that would cause 200,000 
deaths would be much more disruptive of social communit ies than any 
disaster that our country has thus far experienced. As a factor 
mitigating social disruption, the social groups in which Americans 
interact are becoming so widely dispersed that it would be increasingly 
difficult for an event to engulf them. 
3. The magnification associated with the disruption of personal time 
is expected to exceed the escalation of repair costs because individuals 
generally obtain services over a local area that is much smaller than the 
total economic trade area. Also, people are quite sensitive to being 
suckered by charlatans. 
Table 4. First Approximation Magnification Coefficients. 
1. Disruption of repair 
and replacement capability. 
2. Disruption of support 
from social group 
3. Disruption of 
personal time 
4. Exposure to 
disturbing experiences 
5. Disruption of basic 
community infrastructure 
6. Loss of personal 
property 
7. Disruption of health 
care services 
8. Deterioration of 
mental health 
9. Inefficiencies 1n 
emergency services 
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6 
20 
8 
50 
2 
6 
3 
30 
10 
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4. Soc iety seems to be los ing many family and small-group support 
mechanisms and consequently seems to be increasingly vulnerable to severe 
psychological disturbances. Mental disorders seem to be on the increase. 
A super catastrophe would expose people, communities, and regions to 
experiences more disturbing than any that the United States has suffered 
since the Civil War. One would consequently expect large magnification 
here. 
5. The modern city dweller is dependent on services provided through 
community infrastructure. On the other side, utilities generally have the 
resources to recover quickly, people are mobile, and the disturbances 
resulting from disruptions that people accept as reasonable do not seem 
large. The replacement of aging, inefficient, or obsolete may be 
attractive. Magnification is also expected to be smaller here because the 
infrastructure repair cost s themselves are so large. Magnificat ion is 
also expected to be smaller here because the infrastructure repair costs 
themselves are so Large. 
6. The magnitude of the sense of loss that people feel from lost 
heirlooms is unknown. Estimates made from Kentucky data on the ratio of 
the personal value to the economic value of real property suggest a 
maximum factor of 2.25 (James 1968). The primary contributors to personal 
value were the length of time the property had been in the family, where 
the family would be required to move elsewhere, and the difficulty in 
purchasing acceptable substitute property. Except in cases where losses 
of personal property remove a sense of security that undermines mental 
health, one would expect this magnification to be about the same as it is 
for economic loss. 
7. Heal th services In the United States have been able to respond 
effectively and rapidly to major disasters. The magnification in this 
area may largely be caused by large expenses incurred when rescue and care 
are operated in an emergency mode. 
8. Mental health problems could magnify immensely with larger scale 
events. On the other side, people rise to the challenge of recovery; and 
mental health may actually be improved among the more active. This 
consideration was the basis for holding this multiplier smaller than that 
used for Process 4. 
9. Our emergency services are geared to disasters much smaller than 
the "worst case scenario." One would expect gross inefficiencies and some 
counter productive activities with the larger events. 
VII. LOCATION ANALYSIS 
The analysis to determine the magnification caused by the failure of a 
specific dam could employ the following steps: 
1. Employ one of the available models for routing flood waves 
downstream following a major dam break. The results should be expressed 
on a flood-severity map showing the maximum depths and velocities of 
flooding over the extent of the inundated area. Federal agencies have 
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mapped the areas subject to inundation below a number of major dams for 
purposes of evacuation planning. 
2. Map current land use over this area. 
should encompass natural and anthropocentric 
measuring losses with respect to all of the 
outlined in Table 1. 
3. For each of the nine principal processes: 
The land use depiction 
propert ies relevant to 
nine principal processes 
a. Estimate the property-scale damage 
land use with flood severity based on 
and Tagaras (1986) provide ratios 
casualties. 
to be expected by integrating 
these two maps. Pate-Cornell 
for estimating damages and 
b. Make a judgment as to whether this loss is sufficient to cause 
community-scale magnification by comparing the property-scale damage 
with the "impact measure" in Tab le 1. 
c. For processes where community-scale impact seems probab le, use 
information from the literature to make the expansions indicated in 
Tables 2 and 3. The numbers on Table 4 provide a general order of 
magnitude to use as a start. This assessment should consider both 
the magnification of property-scale processes and the introduction of 
new processes at the community scale. 
4. For each of the nine principal processes: 
a. Make a judgment as to whether the community-scale losses are 
sufficient to cause regional-scale magnification. 
b. Use the above principles to estimate a general order of magnitude. 
This assessment should consider further magnification of property-
scale processes, magnification of community-scale processes, and the 
introduction of new processes at the community scale. 
VIII. RESEARCH SUGGESTIONS 
A. Topics. A number of research suggest ions are provided in present ing 
followup ideas for more careful delineat ion of damages within the ten goal 
domains. Other thoughts on topics that should be studied further include: 
1. Descriptions of the impact processes that occur during a 
catastrophe and of how they have been altered by "protect ion" systems. 
Items include the movement of flood waves, how people respond in ways that 
reduce or add to the losses, and how communities act in ways that reduce 
or add to the total loss experienced in their boundaries. 
2. Documentation of the aftermath and recovery dimensions of 
economic, social, and environmental impacts (concentrating on the nine 
principal processes listed in Table 1) associated with historical 
catastrophes or with events at the time they occur. 
3. Scientific analyses of documented impacts in order to develop 
theoretical constructs for explaining what occurred and for use in 
assessing the consequences of future situations. 
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4. Analyses of reconstruction processes, with particular emphasis on 
reconstruction at the community and regional scales, and the time period 
required for recovery of the local and regional economies, environments, 
and social systems. 
B. Ultimate Goal. As an ultimate planning tool, one can dream of a 
multiple feedback loop simulation model that encompasses event, aftermath, and 
recovery processes and the interactions among them to estimate catastrophe and 
super catastrophe consequences. The research recommended above to develop 
understanding of the major processes is seen as an initial step to this 
ultimate goal. 
APPENDIX I 
DESCRIPTIVE REPORTS ON MAJOR CATASTROPHES 
Combining Contemporary Journalistic Reports with 
Assessments and Analyses by Later Observers 
I. JOHNSTOWN FLOOD, MAY 31, 1889 
Information synthesized from New York Times reports. 
Storm Event 
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The flood was caused by the breaking of a dam at the foot of a mountain 
lake, about nine miles up the valley of the South Fork of the Conemough River. 
The lake, between 200-300 feet above the level of Johnstown (populat ion 
25,000, is 3.5 miles long and 1 to 1 1/4 miles wide. In some places it is 100 
feet deep. At the time, it held more water than any other reservoir natural 
or artificial in the u.S. The lake had earlier been quadrupled in size by 
artificial means and was held in check by a dam from 700 to 1,000 feet wide. 
The dam was 90 feet in thickness at the base and tapered to a little more than 
20 feet at the top with a height of 110 feet. 
Steady rains over the preceding 48 hours increased the volume of water in 
all the small mountain streams which were already swollen by earlier rains. 
From available information, something in the nature of a cloud burst must have 
been the culmination of the struggle of the water against the embankment. 
Dam Failure 
According to Herbert Webber (a guard at the South Fork Club), for three 
days before the first outburst, the water of the lake forced itself out 
through the interstices of the masonry, so that the front of the dam resembled 
a large watering pot. The force of the water was so great that one of these 
jets squirted full thirty (30) feet horizontally from the stone wall. At this 
time, the streams feeding the lake resembled torrents and were carrying 
3,000,000 gallons of water hourly. 
Webber was present when the dam began to give way. At about 12:45 p.m. 
(May 31), the stones in the center of the dam began to sink because of 
undermining, and within 8 minutes a gap of 20 feet was made in the lower half 
of the wall face. By 1 o'clock, the top masonry fell in, and the remainder of 
the wall opened outward like twin gates. It did not take more than 5 minutes 
for the lake to drop 50 feet. 
Warnings 
. Recognizing the potential danger the dam posed to residents downstream, 
it was inspected once a month by the Pennsylvania Railroad Engineers. The 
inspections showed that nothing less than some convulsion of nature would tear 
the barrier away. 
For over a year, there 
occurred. The foundations 
spring before the disaster. 
to time. 
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were fears of an accident of the magnitude that 
of the dam were considered to be shaky in the 
Many increasing leakages were reported from time 
Webber said he had repeatedly called the attention of the members of 
South Fork Club (owners of the dam) to the many leakages. He was always told 
that the dam was all right; that it had been "built to stand for centuries" 
and that its giving way was impossible. Webber next laid his complaints 
before the mayor who promised to investigate but did nothing. 
Opinions are divided as to whether sufficient warning was given to 
residents on the day of the disaster. According to people who live in 
Johnstown and other surrounding towns, ample warning was given to the 
Johnstown folks by the railroad officials and by other gentlemen of standing 
and reputation. In many cases, these warnings were utterly disregarded. 
Severity 
- The Little Juniata, Frankstown Branch and Juniata Rivers that for most of 
the year are mere brooks, were over thirty (30) feet deep. 
- The flood depth was over 20 feet in Johnstown. 
Lake level dropped 50 feet in 5 minutes. 
Damages 
- Below the dam for a distance of 3/4 mile stretched a mighty mass of 
wreckage, 40-60 feet high and 700-800 feet wide. The wreckage contained dead 
persons. 
- Dead bodies could be seen in the river as far away as Pittsburgh (100 miles 
from th'e scene of the disaster). 
- At one point on the river, a telegraph operator counted 63 bodies 1.n 20 
minutes floating past on the day of the disaster. 
- At 6 o'clock on the day of the disaster, a Superintendent of the 
Pennsylvan ia Railroad (Robert Pitcain) telegraphed from San Hollow west of 
Johnstown, that he had seen about 200 persons afloat on gondola cars, 
shanties, etc. and that the disaster was appalling. 
- A telegraph operator and San Harbour, in the Pennsylvania Railroad tower, 
said that at least 75 bodies had floated past that point. 
- The scene of the disaster was cutoff entirely from all communication. Even 
48 hours after the disaster, communication had not been restored. 
- Houses, bridges and factories were overwhelmed in the twinkling of an eye. 
Also destroyed were railroads and telegraph lines. 
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- All railroad and wagon bridges were swept downstream in a watery avalanche. 
Countless houses that were never dreamed to be in any danger of flooding were 
also swept away. 
- The Pennsylvania Railroad was submerged for a distance of 30 mi les. The 
Blairsville Railroad bridge was swept away together with a train of loaded 
coal cars which had been run upon it with the idea of holding the bridge in 
place. The bridge was 875 feet long with 500 feet of trestle. 
- Western Union's nearest point of communication was New Florence) 14 miles 
west of Johnstown. It was impossible to communicate with that locality from 
the east. 
- A week after the disaster, careful est imates placed the number of bod ies 
recovered at half of those that had perished. Out of a population of 30,000, 
18,000 had made themselves known to the Registration Office. It was estimated 
that some of the people missing had left town and that about 10% of the 
survivors would fail to make their identity known. City officials estimated 
that at the outside, not more than 21,000 or 22,000 would be accounted for; 
leaving 8,000 or 9,000 dead. 
- It was est imated that about $3,000,000 would be required to clear the 
wreckage from Johnstown and its vicinity. 
Assessments 
- It was alleged that the dam was formerly a small affair that had been 
enlarged by the South Fork Club to hold four times as much water as before. 
Referring to the enlargement of the dam, Engineer Church (formerly Chief and 
then Consulting Engineer of the Aqueduct Commission) said that on general 
principles it was unwise to enlarge any masonry dam that had not originally 
been built for future enlargement. From the little definite infor.mation 
available, he was inclined to think that the wasteway of the dam was too small 
to pass the unusual amount of water coming downstream) and that the dam had 
failed on that account. 
In response to safety concerns raised by opponents of the great Quaker 
Bridge Dam, (a dam under consideration for construction at the time) he said, 
lithe new dam will have provisions made for safely carrying off a flood 60 
times greater than ever occurred in that locality and the dam itself will be 
able to hold back all the water that can be forced against it. And even if 
the dam should break and its waters be precipitated into the Hudson, the river 
would not be affected sufficiently to even show a rise at Sing Sing." 
II. GALVESTON, TEXAS, HURRICANE, SEPT. 8, 1900 
As reported in the New York Times 
Galveston Island on which the City of Galveston is situated, is 28 miles 
long and 1 1/2 to 3 1/2 miles wide. It is 4-5 feet above tide level. 
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Severity 
- Wind speed of over 80 mph. 
- Water was 3 feet in the rotunda of the Tremont Hote 1 and 6 feet in Market 
Street. In a great majority of cases, the streets were submerged to a depth 
of 10 feet. The highest level of land in the city was 4-5 feet under water. 
- Relief trains sent out to Galveston had to return as they could not get 
closer than 6 miles of Virginia Point where the Prairie was covered with 
lumber, debris, pianos, trucks and dead bodies. 
Damages 
- Four bridges, the main link between Galveston and the mainland, were swept 
away by the terrible force of wind and water in the bay. Three of the bridges 
were for railroad use, and one was the Galveston County Public Wagon and 
pedestrian bridge. 
- All forms of communication between Galveston and the outside world were 
disrupted. Telegraph and telephone lines were destroyed. 
- The water works and power house were wrecked. 
threatened. The city was in darkness. 
- At least 5,000 families had no shelter. 
- Death toll estimated at 5,000. 
Severe water shortage was 
- Property loss was estimated to be $15 to $20 million. 
Reconstruction 
- Five days after the disaster, some businesses put men to work to begin to 
repair· the damages. However, most commerc ial interests seemed too uncertain 
to follow the lead of those showing faith in the rapid rehabilitation of the 
island city. Most businessmen were waiting to see what the attitude of the 
railroads, especially the Southern Pacific, would be. Reporters felt that the 
decision of the transportation lines, more than anything else, would restore 
confidence and speed reconstruction. 
III. SAN FRANCISCO EARTHQUAKE AND FIRE, APRIL 18, 1906 
As reported in the New York Times, April 19. 
Earthquake 
- Over 500 dead and $200,000,000 worth of property destroyed. 
- Nearly half of the city is in ruins. 
- 50,000 homeless and 1,000 injured. 
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- Water supply fails. 
- Telegraph and telephone cutoff for a time. Western Union was completely out 
of business. Only the post office managed to send out a wire. 
- Electric power was cutoff. 
- Street cars could not operate since tracks were badly damaged. Ferry boats 
also ceased operation. 
- Tall steel frame structures stood the strain better than did brick 
buildings. A portion of City Hall which cost more than $7,000,000 collapsed. 
The new post office, one of the finest in the United States, was bad ly 
shattered. 
Fires 
- Immediately after the earthquake, fire started. 
- The fire department could not respond to the emergency because the water 
supply was cutoff. Hence dynamite was used to blow down buildings so as to 
control the spread of the fire. This, however, proved futile. 
- The south side of Market Street, from 9th Street to the bay, was soon 
ablaze. The fire covered a belt two blocks wide. On this main thoroughfare 
were many of the finest edifices in the city. They included the Grant, 
Parrott, Flood, Call, Examiner and Monadnock build ings and the Palace and 
Grand Hotels. These were either destroyed or badly damaged. At the same 
time, commer.cial establishments and banks north of Market Street were burning. 
Claus Spreckels, a fifteen story stone and iron building was consumed by fire. 
Banks and commercial houses, supposed to be fire proof (though not of modern 
build) burned quickly. 
- Dynamite available was not sufficient to handle the emergency hence the 
mayor made an urgent appeal to the governor for more. 
- Chief of pol ice ordered the closure of every Saloon in the ci ty so as to 
prevent 'drink-crazed' men from rioting 1n the streets. 
- Mayor Schmitz ordered bakeries and milk stations to reserve their supplies 
for the homeless. 
- The mayor establ ished a base of rescue. Rescuers jumped into collapsed 
buildings and pulled out the dead, the dying and the injured. Practically 
every physician volunteered his assistance, and soon a well equipped medical 
corps was organized and began ministering to the injured. 
Provisions were made to place tents in every park in the city. 
- Every possible precaution was taken to guard property. Police turned out on 
guard, and the governor and General Funston (commanding the Pacific Division 
of the U.S. Army) were asked to send troops. Soldiers were ordered to shoot 
down vandals caught robbing the dead. 
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- The insane asylum at Agnew was a total wreck. 270 inmates were killed out 
of a total of 700 people. Hundreds of inmates who escaped are roaming the 
streets in a state of panic. 
- Provisions were sold at fancy prices, and even water was sold by the glass. 
- The Southern Pacific Ra ilroad carried out of town all those who wanted to 
leave. No one was allowed to enter, and those who le ft were not ab le to get 
back for a while. 
- On April 19, the following resolution was adopted by Congress: 
The Secretary of War 1S hereby authorized and directed 
-- to loan to the Mayors of the cities of San Francisco, Berkeley, 
Oakland, Alameda and such other cities on the Pacific Coast as have sustained 
damage, under such regulat ions and restrictions as he may deem proper, a 
sufficient number of tents to temporarily shelter such persons as may have 
been rendered homeless and lost property by the earthquake; 
-- to issue rations and supplies and to render such other aid to the 
destitute and others unable to provide for themselves; 
-- to work with the Secretaries of Treasury and of the Navy in extending 
reI ief and ass i'stance to stricken people to the extent of the use of Naval 
vessels, revenue cutters, and supplies under their control on the Pacific 
Coast. 
April 20 
- 200,000 or about hat f of the population of San Frand sco spent the night 
under open sky in the parks and other open spaces in the city. 
- There was the threat of famine. Troops and Police seized every unburned 
grocery and bakery in the city and husbanded all their resources. 
- Show of goodwill came from all parts of the country. Congress appropriated 
$1,000,000 for the benefit of the suffers, and President Roosevelt signed it 
before dark so as to make the money available immediately. 
- Victims of the disaster invaded the few buildings that remained in the hope 
of finding something to eat. At the Ferry Building, a crowd of thousands 
gathered begging for food and transportation across the bay. Even men of 
wealth could not obtain food with all their money. Expressman charged $10 to 
$50 to haul a load of baggage or give any aid to refugees. The situat ion 
became so critical that Mayor Schmidt sent the following message to Governor 
Pardee: "Send all supplies and tents possible to Golden Gate Park. Have 
bakeries in small towns bake all the bread they can. We want bedding, food, 
and tents." 
- Entrepreneurs were already planning to start reconstruction. The following 
advertisement was placed in the New York Times by the United Cigar Stores Co. 
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"We have had ten of our stores and warehouses destroyed in San Francisco 
(fortunately among our own people no lives were lost). Our own loss of close 
to $300,000 measures small in our grief and sympathy for our friends and 
customers. However, this is our policy: We have sent ten of our best men 
including our Treasurer, Director of Construction and General Superintendent 
there, with orders to open TWENTY new stores immediately. We believe the city 
will be rebuilt at once. We understand the damage from earthquake was small 
and in the rebuilding steel construction will undoubtedly remove the 
possibility of future disaster from fire or earthquake. WE WANT TO BE PART OF 
THE BIG BOOM THE NEW SAN FRANCISCO will have. We believe it will be a better 
and greater city than ever, and we will back our judgment with our money." 
Reports on Reconstruction of the City 
(edited Haas et al. 1977) 
More than half of the housing and at least two-thirds of the jobs in San 
Franc isco were destroyed by thi s disaster. Free transportation was given as 
an incentive to victims willing to leave the city. 300,000 victims availed 
themselves of this opportunity. Between 65,000 and 75,000 never returned. 
Housing 
First Phase 
- Temporary housing was supplied in authorized and unauthorized camps. 
- The first authorized housing took the form of 8,000-10,000 tents supplied 
mainly by the U.S. Army. These tents housed more than 20,000 people during 
the summer of 1906. Unauthorized tent and shack camps housed about as many 
more. Health and sanitation were worse but less rigid living conditions meant 
greater freedom. Tents were feasible because of the mild climate of 
California summers. 
Second Phase 
- Erection of substantial wooden 2- and 3-room "cottages,1I organized in 
offic ial camps in city parks and plazas close to jobs and the de s t royed 
central area. 4,750 cot tages were occupied before the first severe winter 
storm (January, 1907). One year after the disaster, 6,200 cottages were 
available to house 20,000 (5 percent of the homeless populat ion). 
- Within 26 months of the disaster, the cottages were moved to private 
property and made permanent structures. There was a high vacancy rate in the 
cottages (late 1906) and high attrition when the cottages were moved from 
refugee camps to private property in 1908. This is an indication that the two 
moves (from tents to temporary cot tages and then to permanent homes) were 
enforced prematurely for most of the families. This was particularly true for 
refugees famil ies who were unskilled, foreign-born, and headed by women and 
old people for whom housing and suitable rents did not exist. The pressure to 
move apparently came from upper- and middle-class citizens who projected their 
own return to normalcy (in jobs and homes) to be the condition of all social 
groups in the city. There seems to be a tendency for refugee camps to turn 
into permanent homes for the disadvantaged. 
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- In order to insulate the lower class from the housing market at a time when 
rents were uncontrolled and extreme, authorities intended to allow them to 
occupy emergency housing until no longer than 1910. However, in 1911, many 
families in San Francisco had still not returned to homes obtained through the 
hous ing market. 
- Middle and upper classes were forced to compete for housing in the market in 
the summer of 1906. About 8,000 housing units were constructed between August 
1906 and October 1907. This represented a replacement of about one-third of 
the destroyed housing in the first eighteen months (seems low for at least 
250,000 people made homeless). Thereafter, the rate of housing construction 
fell to about half of this rate until 1911 by which time the city's building 
stock had been replaced. 
Business 
- A decision to rebuild in San Francisco was made by a major bank four months 
after the 1906 earthquake. Other large financial institutions, insurance, 
real estate and banking institutions followed. Their chosen locations defined 
the extent of a new financial district. 
- As soon as the locational decisions of these financial institutions had 
outlined the financial district, department stores began to build in 
boundaries that defined a new apparel shopping district. Hotels came third. 
Large hotels established the outlines of a new hotel district. 
- It generally took longer for businesses formerly located near the edge of 
the central district to reestablish themselves. These activities were forced 
to take suboptimal locations for up to eight years. As a result, some 
businesses either failed or relocated outside of the disaster-stricken city. 
The resulting employment losses were generally to blue collar and, to a lesser 
extent, semi-skilled and unskilled workers. In the manufacturing sector for 
example, there were 450 fewer jobs in San Francisco three years after the 
disaster than there were before it (1904). The exodus of manufacturing plants 
dropped San Francisco's share of manufacturing employment in the Bay Area from 
33% in 1904 to 23% in 1909 and 1914. This lower percentage was still holding 
in 1914. 
- Employment in middle- and upper-class occupations--office, administrative 
and financial services, and retaiLing--increased relatively and absolutely 
between 1906 and 1915. 
- Other businesses that particularly suffered from the disaster were the 
wholesale and manufacturing concerns dependent upon the low rents of old and 
amortized buildings in near-central locations, close to the external economies 
that come from the concentration of hundreds of linked activities in a tightly 
circumscribed area. In San Francisco, 894 small business establishments, many 
of the above type, received Relief Committee loans to rehabilitate. Two years 
after the disaster, only half were self-supporting while most of the remainder 
(351) were not in business. Of these, 211 were never again able to establish 
a business enterprise despite the grants of the Relief Committee. 
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- The financial pressures during disaster recovery placed greatest stress on 
the lower social class. They were dislocated for the largest period. Many 
were forced to locate on land unclaimed by the more affluent to sub urbanize to 
East Bay towns, or to leave the Bay Area altogether. 
- Most of the lower class, however, found moving permanently or temporarily to 
other Bay Area towns to be not viab Ie. Transport cost s and travel time were 
too high for them to live in the East Bay and work in San Francisco. 
- Most lower class decided to leave in 1906 and others did so after the 
enforced closing of the refugee camps 1907-08. A large proportion of the 
300,000 people that left San Francisco in the two weeks after the disaster 
were of the lower socioeconomic classes. Seventy-four % of the unskilled 
sampled in 1906 failed to return to the Bay Area by 1907, and 87% of them had 
gone from the Bay Area by 1911. 
IV. FAILURE OF SAINT FRANCIS DAM, MARCH 13, 1928 
Reported in the New York Times. 
The Saint Francis Dam was part of the Owen Valley 
supplies the City of Los Angeles and other communities 
Valley with water for irrigat ion and domest ic purposes. 
in the mountains northwest of the city on the Santa Clara 
above the ocean. 
Aqueduct System that 
in the San Fernando 
The dam was located 
River about 7S miles 
At 1 o'clock in the morning (March 13, 1928), the dam gave way and 88,000 
acre feet of stored water was instantly rushing on a mad race to the sea. The 
dry bed of the Santa Clara River provided the initial flow, but soon the bank 
broke and a plain up to 60 miles wide was at the mercy of the flood. 
The St ate Eng ineer (Edward Hyat t, Jr.) said that according to his 
reports, the dam was in perfect condition before the break and that it had 
been inspected regularly under state supervision. 
Warnings 
Mrs. A. M. Rumsey, a postmistress at the nearby town of Sangus, said that 
for ten (0) days before the dam break, ranchers "talked of nothing else" but 
leaks in the structure and the possibility of the disaster. 
A motorist reported that while driving up the canyon road, he saw an 
unusual quantity of muddy water coursing through the ordinarily dry sttream 
bed. He drove up to the dam and noticed that the water behind the buttress 
was within 3 feet of the top and that the spillway gates were apparently 
closed, although there was a good stream running down the canyon. Further 
down the road, the motorist saw a gang of workmen drilling holes apparently in 
preparation for dynamite blasts to blow off the shoulder of a hill not more 
than 200 feet from the dam. 
At the time of failure, warnings were telephoned to residents below the 
dam but apparently insufficient time was available for people living in the 
upper part of the canyon to flee. 
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Severity 
- The dam break occurred at 1 a.m. and in 3 hours, the flood wave was 20 miles 
down the valley moving at about 10 feet per second. 
- Silt deposited in some sections of the Santa Clara River bed was 30 feet 
deep. 
- Only the central section of the dam was left standing. The east and west 
sections had been eroded away by the water released from the reservo ir 
stretching 5 miles up the canyon from the dam site. 
Damages 
- The Los Angeles municipal power house below the dam was demolished. 
- 500 homes were destroyed or greatly damaged. 
- Ten important bridges were destroyed including the railway bridge between 
Ventura and Oxnard. The State highway bridge at Castaic and the steel bridge 
of the Southern Pacific branch from Sangus to Montalvo were also destroyed. 
- State and county highways washed out at numerous points. 
- Telegraph and telephone lines disrupted. 
- 1500 persons were left virtually homeless, and many of these were, 
temporarily at least, destitute. 
- Livestock killed and drowned. 
- 20 lineal miles of citrus orchards were buried under many feet of mud and 
silt. 
- 10,000 acres of orchards had been swept over by the flood. Preliminary 
surveys indicated that probably $500/ acre would have to be spent to restore 
the silt covered area. At the time of the disaster, the orchard land was 
valued at about $5,000/acre. 
- Property loss was estimated at $15,000,000 to $30,000,000. 
- Death toll estimated at 400. 
Assessment of the Failure 36 Years Later 
(Gri swold 1964) 
Dam Description 
The 2-year old 
reinforced concrete, 
Francisquito Canyon. 
thick at its base and 
concave bulwark, containing 137,000 cubic yards of 
rose 205 feet above the narrow streambed in San 
Its crestline measured 700 feet. The dam was 180 feet 
tapered to 16 feet at the top. Behind it lay a four-
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mile long reservoir. At the moment of the disaster, the dam held about 12 
billion gallons of water. 
severity 
- 10,000 ton chunks of concrete, the size of bungalows were tumbled as far as 
3/4 mile by the towering dark wall of water that lunged down the San 
Francisquito Canyon. 
- Only the dams center section, 205 feet high and about 100 feet wide resisted 
the tremendous pressures. 
- The plunging torrent from the broken dam, swelled to a flow greater than 
500,000 cfs, reached a depth of 125 feet as it tore at the curves of it s 
tortuous channel. 
- One and a half miles down the canyon, stood Los Angeles' Municipal Power 
Plant No.2. It was a two-story building of heavily reinforced concrete, 
containing two-lOO ton dynamos. Close by huddled a settlement of 65 persons. 
- Five minutes after the dam crumbled, this community was swept away. 
- The power house, struck by a flood wave that rose even higher than 125 feet, 
was obliterated as if it had been a tent. 
- Half an hour after the collapse, the plunging waters were still 50-feet deep 
and scoured out the contents of the canyon. 
- 38 miles below the dam, the flood wave was 25 feet high. 
Damages 
- An estimated 450 lives were lost. 
accurate count is not available. 
Even 36 years after the disaster, an 
- 8,000 acres of productive land were laid to waste. 
- Unnumbered herds of livestock and flocks of poultry were killed. 
- Economic losses were estimated at $10 million. 
Reasons for Failure 
- 72 year old William Mulholland, Chief Engineer of the L.A. Water and Power 
Dept. took full responsibility for the dam's design and location. Said he, 
II If ·r was to build St. Francis Dam again, I would build it in the same manner, 
but not in the same place. That place where it was built was vulnerable 
against human aggression. 1I 
- "Unfortunately," the investigators appointed by the Governor to seek out the 
cause for dam failure wrote, "in this case the foundation under the entire dam 
left very much to be desired." The rocky cleft of the canyon, which the dam 
straddled, consisted of an insubstantial mica schist on the east side and an 
51 
even less substantial reddish conglomerate on the west, the report explained. 
The two rock formations met, under the west wing of the dam, along a "dead" 
earthquake fault, ideally designed by nature for seepage. To make matters 
worse, the conglomerate "even when dry was of decidedly inferior strength ••. 
when wet, became so soft that most of it lost almost all rock 
characteristics." The investigators concluded that "the ultimate failure of 
this dam was inevitable, unless waster could have been kept from reaching the 
foundation." 
V. LYNMOUTH, ENGLAND FLOOD, AUGUST 15, 1952 
(Delderfield 1953) 
Heavy rains on the night of August 15, 1952, caused the biggest flood 
from the smallest area ever known in England. Lynmouth is a fi shing and 
vacation village immortalized by poets Shelley and Southey and by Blackmore in 
the novel, Lorna Doone. 
The flood 
mph. Bridges, 
water scouring 
for 200 years. 
to the sea. 
produced a wall of water up to 40 feet high and moving at 20 
10-ton boulders went through walls like bullets through paper, 
undercut the foundations of buildings that had been untouched 
The river drops several hundred feet in the last half-a-mile 
A total of 34 people were drowned. 
destroyed, 28 bridges, 132 vehicles. 
93 houses and buildings were 
Some descriptive phrases: 
p.28 - "The party •• was in pitch darkness and soaked to the skin, in complete 
ignorance of what was happening elsewhere and had an overriding anxiety about 
the whole situation." 
p.29 - .JtTime ceased to exist for most of those concerned" 
p.31 - itA particularly violent roar was heard above the general tumult." 
p.34 - "Some ideal of the awful force of the water may be gleaned from the 
fact that the body of nine-year-old Kenneth Bowen, who was swept away from the 
same house, was found under a s lab In a butcher I s shop in the Watersmeet 
Road. " 
p.38 - "At intervals in the hours that followed, the sixty occupants of the 
hotel mounted floor by floor until they were at the top of the building. 
Provided with rugs, blankets, and eiderdowns but without light, heat, food or 
drink, they sat together as the interminable hours dragged by. It was an 
agonizing period of suspense. 
In the direct course of the flooded rives and in the path of the pounding 
debris, the hotel received a severe bat tering for hours on end. The very 
walls seemed to rock and the groaning and straining of timbers, together with 
the roar of the waters, the thunder and 1 ightning, and the whimpering of 
terror- st ricken children was a nightmare experience, which wi 11 never be 
forgotten by those who were unfortunate enough to take part in it.1I 
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p.41 - the· greatest bravery was being shown in every corner of the litt le 
town. 1I 
p.44 - scores of people were trapped in buildings beside the river with a 
cliff rising steeply behind them. 
p.65 - the force of the scouring water caused so much destruction that the 
town was not recognizable even by those who knew it best. 
p.66 - The Rhenish Tower, which must have figured in millions of holiday 
snapshots, had disappeared. 
p.86 - '~erhaps as heartening to the people as anything else was the concern 
and interest displayed in their trouble by Her Majesty's Ministers and other 
important personages." 
Large amounts of volunteer labor, government sponsored workers, and 
donations had the town reopened by early September. 
VI. NEW YORK TIMES ACCOUNT OF HURRICANE CAMILLE, AUGUST 18, 1969 
Reports by Associated Press in the New York Times. 
- Wind speeds of up to 150 mph with high tides and tornadoes. 
- 200,000 people fled inland from Mississippi's coastal area during the day. 
- According to the police superintendent, Gulfport 00,000) was completely 
destroyed, and the Memorial Hospital was calling for help. The city had no 
power and no communication with the outside. 
- The Weather Bureau warned of tides driven by the winds to heights of up to 
20 feet in the area of maximum storm power. 
- Red Cross reported that 394 evacuation shelters had been set up in the storm 
area. Reports indicated that 44,541 refugees were in the shelters with more 
coming in. 
- In Gulfport, nearly all refugee centers had run out of food and water before 
the storm arrived. 
- Most of the low lying areas in Louisiana were cleared early in a scramble 
that started with the first warnings. 
- Traffic on highways leading inland from Mississippi's coast was frequently 
bumper to bumper during the day. Many of Alabama's coastal exodus headed for 
Mobile. Authorities said 5,500 re s were in the city's seven emergency 
centers. 
- Rising tides covered highways near the coast in Mississippi and Alabama. 
Other South Mississippi highways were closed in the night by the highway 
patrol because of debris. 
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- The Mississippi River Bridge was closed to traffic. The world's longest 
bridge, the 26-mile causeway across Lake Pontchartrain was blocked off. 
- Most of the city's activity was in groceries and drug stores and they were 
jammed on a Sunday when they would normally be closed. Customers were trying 
to buy flashlights, flashlight and radio batteries or candles. But they were 
no where to be found. 
- Long lines formed at gasoline stations. 
August 19 
- Civil defense officials 1n Mississippi reported 100 dead from along the 
Coast and expected the toll to increase to between 150 and 200. 
- Fires burned out of control because fire fighting units could not reach 
them. Communications were disrupted. 
- Most of the Gulf Coast was without electricity, gas or drinking water. 
- Red Cross reported its shelters housed more than 70,000 persons ln 
Louisiana, Alabama, and Mississippi during the night. 
- The Buena Vista Hotel on the Coast of Biloxi had water 8 feet deep on its 
ground floor, destroying all the facilities of radio station WLOX. 
Reports on Effects in the Construction Industry 
Hurricane Camille caused substantial shortages of both labor and 
materials for reconstruction along the Mississippi Gulf Coast. Mr. George P. 
Hopkins, Jr. (past president of the Mississippi Gulf Coast Chapter of the 
Assoc iated General Contrac tors) appeared be fore the Senate Subcommi ttee on 
Disaster Relief of the Committee of Public Works to describe the situation 
five months after the disaster. He felt that the amount of work required for 
restoration exceeded their industry's capabilities as they existed before the 
disaster. Asked, whether construction costs in the area after the disaster 
had gone up d isproport iona te ly to the rest of the country, Mr. Hopkins 
replied: 
"I would say immediately following the storm, when the tremendous 
influx came into the area and at one time we checked with the Better 
Business Bureau, we had over 700 foreign construction firms or 
individuals in the area. I would say yes, the costs did go up. Even 
in my own business the people that we had subcontracted on some items 
such as roofing, and that sort, I couldn't hire them for twice what I 
paid them 6 months before. In that line, I am talking about the 
shinglers. They saw an opportunity and they hit it .•• , To some 
extent, it is not completely justified, but you can understand that 
when a man has 15 places he is going to go, he is going to go where 
he can do the best •• , , In my own business, I had at least a half 
dozen of my men quit and go into the construction business because of 
this fact," (Hopkins, 1970). 
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- The primary shortage in the aftermath of the disaster was labor. Common 
laborers who got $2.00 per hour prior to the disaster were getting up to $7.00 
per hour in the post-disaster recovery period. Labor costs were typically 
more than doubled. 
- There was also a critical shortage of skilled laborers such as plumbers and 
electric ians. This necessitated import ing skilled workers from other market 
areas at premium rates. The importation aggravated the shortage of living 
. accommodations, caused rents to rise, increased subsistence costs, and 
contributed to the high labor costs. 
- Increased demand also caused difficulty in obtaining construction materials 
and equipment. In addition valuable supplies were destroyed by the hurricane. 
The resulting shortage increased the cost of building materials and equipment. 
For example, a cherry picker with operator which rented for $12-16 per hour 
prior to the storm, rented for $25 per hour during the period following the 
disaster. The shortage of building materials would have been worse had 
stockpiled items not been available from military and other government depots. 
- The availability of federal money and low interest loans from the Small 
Business Administrat ion (SBA) increased the demand for immed ia te repa irs. 
Many complained that prices went up substantially, even astronomically, under 
the temptation of money brought in by SBA, insurance adjustments, and other 
monies. This was brought out by Mr. Hopkins in his testimony before the 
Senate Subcommittee on Disaster Rel tef of the Committee on Public Works. On 
the price gouging problem, he said: 
"I know it has happened, but I cannot speak from personal 
experience. I have talked to people who have been approached and the 
prices presented to them were out of line. I can give you one 
personal experience. Immediately after the storm an insurance 
adjustor came to me from another area and said 'Look, this is an 
estimate I have on damage. What is it?' I said, 'Well, I have not 
the time to go look at it, but you tell me what you have done and how 
you would adjust it.' And he told me this figure. From his figure I 
could tell him he was reasonable. I told him to go back to the owner 
with the estimate he had, which should have been $10,000 instead of 
$19,000. He went to the owner and gave him the estimate and they 
settled for $10,000. This is the only case I came across personally, 
but it has happened." (Hopkins, 1970) 
Damages 
Reports from Congress 
Congressional Record, Sept. 3, 1969 
- Representative Colmer of Mississippi reported that millions of dollars of 
timber, as well as the tung oil orchards and the pecan industry, on the 
shoreline and the interior, were devastated. Conservative estimates show $1 
billion in damage. Thousands of homes, hundreds of beautiful motels and 
hotels, and many miles of highways were destroyed. Possibly as many as 300 
people lost their lives. 
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- Representative McCormack from Massachusetts suggested that, if the disaster 
loan 1 aw and other exist ing laws were not adequate to meet some of the 
situations, Congress should act very rapidly and very quickly to pass 
additional legislation. 
- Representat ive Keith from Massachusetts stressed the need for a national 
disaster policy on the part of the Federal Government, to replace the present 
piecemeal approach to the problem. The largest damages from hurricanes are 
due to the abnormally high tides for which there is no insurance. Citizens 
can collect insurance for wind, rain, and flood damage; but they cannot 
collect for the damage caused by the abnormally high tides wh ich inevitably 
accompany the storms. There should be a national policy covering such 
situations. 
Assistance Provided by the USDA 
- Over 3 million pounds of food from school lunch and commodity distribution 
supplies were transported to hurricane victims. 
- On a typical day, 38,975 storm victims received food through USDA to take 
home to feed their families, and 25,215 received food from USDA stocks at mass 
feeding stations. 
- Jeep-mounted mist sprayers were used to treat the beach areas with malathion 
insec tic ide so as to ki 11 flies, mosquitoes, and other pests which spread 
diseases. 
- The Agricultural Research Service moved to combat another insect threat, 
fire ants. These ants were scattered by the winds and waters into homes and 
debris. 100,000 pounds of poison bait was used to protect workers and 
refugees. Many were already reported bitten by the fire ants and some 
required hospitalization. 
Comments 
Poisonous, disease spread ing, and obnoxious insects could easily be 
carried by a dam break flood. This requires added medical facilities for 
treating victims and care to find poisons for removing the insects that will 
not lead to later environmental or health problems. 
VII. FLOODS IN BRISTOL, ENGLAND, JULY 11, 1970 
Background 
As reported by Smith et al. (1980), the flood occurred in the early hours 
of July 11. The extent of flooding was unexpected as the flood peak coincided 
with a spring high tide. Those flooded had minimal previous flood experience. 
Homes were covered with the stinking mud of diluted sewage. 
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Results 
- The flooding significantly increased physical and psychiatric ill-heal th. 
Physical problems were more common in males and psychiatric problems in 
females. 
- There was a large increase in the attendance of men living in flooded areas 
to general practit ioners. Women's attendance inc reas ed much les s. The 
increased attendance was most pronounced among people whose homes had had more 
than 4 ft of water through them. 
- Hospital referrals and admissions were more than doubled for a year after 
the floods. The greatest increase was among men. 
- The mortality rate among flood victims rose by 50%. The most pronounced 
rise was in the age group of 45 to 64 where male deaths rose from 7 to 20 and 
female deaths from 5 to 9. These deaths occurred mainly in the third 3-month 
period after the flooding. 
Analysis 
possible factors making the population of Bristol vulnerable to the stress 
resulting from the flood would include the unexpected nature of the event and 
a general lack of flood experience. The high proportion of older people in 
the community may have also contributed. 
s 
These reports do not cover the causes of physical illness or the reasons 
for greater incidence among men. One would suppose that the sewage contained 
slowly acting virus or toxics. Men may have been more actively involved in 
cleaning the putrid mass from the homes. Women could have been 
psychologically impacted by a greater sense of loss of cherished possessions 
and by seeing their husbands' health deteriorate. 
VIII. HURRICANE AGNES 
Reports by John Darnston in the New York Times 
June 20, 1972 
An overnight torrent of rain brought more than 10 inches in 24 hrs. Flood 
waters reached depths of 15 feet in some low lying areas in Westchester 
County. Flooded railroad tracks halted traffic for hours. Traffic was 
chaotic on local streets and approaches to the city in parts of Northern New 
Jersey, Rockland and Westchester Count , and Southern Connect icut. More 
than 10,000 telephone were reported out in Scarsdale. Many local streets were 
impassable. There were no traffic signs advising motorists which streets were 
safe. 
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June 23, 1972 
Twenty-six persons dead and many missing. Bridges in affected areas were 
washed out and some communities, such as Wellsville, became virtual islands. 
Many of the dead were motorists who drove off washed out bridges or who 
suddenly found themselves in the middle of swirling waters. 
Virginia: 6 persons drowned and at least 5 missing. Property damage 
est imated to be in the mill ions; 46 primary highways and 600 secondary 
highways closed because of flooding. Chesapeake and Ohio Railway closed its 
tracks for 165 miles. Drinking water declared unsafe in many communities. 
Thousands of people without electricity and telephone service. 
North Carolina: 2 dead; 27 roads impassable. 
Maryland: 12 persons reported missing or dead. 100,000 homes without 
electric ity. 
Delaware: 1 person dead. 
Pennsylvania: 13 persons were dead and 9 missing. Harr i sb urg , the St at e 
Capitol was closed off. 
June 24, 1972 
Over 75 persons died since stonn started. Five states declared disaster 
areas. Th e Was hi n g t on are a wa t e r sup ply for 1. 2 mill i on p e 0 pIe was 
threatened. Sewage backup posed health threat. 
Damage was particularly heavy along the Susquehanna River. [n places, the 
river rose 32 feet; 10 feet above flood level. 
[~ Virginia, the James River crested more than 35 feet breaking the record 
of 30 feet set in 1771. In the southern tier of New York, the Allengheny 
started to spillover 25 foot high dikes. 
June 25, 1972 
100 dead and more than 1/2 million homeless. 
June 26, 1972 
122 persons dead since start of floods. 
By states, this breaks down to: 
Pennsylvania 47 
New York 23 
Virginia 17 
Maryland 15 
Total estimated damage amounts to $1.6 billion. 
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Later Analysis by Allee, Barnaba and Schempp (1975) 
Severity 
Lan d s 1 ide s con t rib ute d tot he dis r u p t ion 0 f c omm u n i cat ion r 0 ute s , 
including highways, railroads, pipelines and power transmission lines. A 
total of 24 counties were included in a declared Presidential Disaster Area. 
Normal Damages 
Total property damage $3.5 billion 
- Agricultural: 
Crops 
Land 
Buildings 
Livestock 
Fences 
Machinery & 
Equipment 
- Death toll: 
$102 million made up of the following: 
$71 * 106 
$25 * 106 
$3 * 106 
$0.32 * 106 
$0.515 * 106 
$1.7 * 106 
122 people. 
- Personal income in the hardest hit counties (Chemung and Steubeng) fell by 
15.3% of 1971 levels or by a total of $121 million. 
Congressional Reactions 
Hon. Charles A. Vanik of Ohio; June 28, 1972. 
Source: Congressional Record, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session Vol. 118, June 1-29, 
1972 . 
wind and rain caused extensive damage particularly in communities which 
lie along the shore of Lake Erie. 
Congressmen request Federal assi stance for the protect ion of nonpubl ic 
shorelines in areas where benefit-cost ratios would justify such Federal 
assistance. 
Even though Hurricane Agnes caused some damage, he argued that erosion IS 
the maIn concern of the residents. 
In some places, 30 feet of shoreline disappear every year into the waters 
of the lake. 
By the year 2020, 535 acres of land are expected to be lost wi thin a 4-
mile stretch. The present value of the property amounts to $18.9 million. 
Total tax revenue lost to the community would be $3,861,000. 
Intangible: 80% of eroded material will remain suspended m the lake 
thereby increasing pollution. 
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Cost of totally protecting 4 mile shoreline 01,700 feet long section} is 
$2,547,000 or $217/ft. 
Corps of Engineers should not use market discount rate to appraise 
projects. 
Corps of Engineers should change the procedure whereby only 50 years 
lifespan is assigned to projects for economic analysis even though some 
projects have 200 years of useful life. 
Later Assessments 
- Hurricane Agnes caused property damage to the tune of $3.5 billion. As a 
result of this high property damage, demand for contractors who could 
accomplish repair work was high. It was so difficult to get competent 
contractors that, the Navy's Seabees and the Air Forces' Red Horse Squadrons 
(Engineers) helped the Army Corps of Engineers get electricity into homes. 
The Navy assigned 100 men who had the expertise to restore power to 200 homes 
a day. The Corps of Engineers employed up to 800 contract workers a day in 
the Scranton and Wilkes-Barre regions (two severely hit areas) to clean up 
houses and businesses immediately after the disaster. 
- The Corps of Engineers, charged with supervising the repair work done by 
private contractors under its repair program, was quickly faced with the 
problem of depleted building supplies in warehouses as far away as 
Philadelphia. 
- In addition there was an acute shortage of labor. Laborers who could be 
obtained were often unskilled, expensive and undependable. 
- The shortage of building supplies and labor resulted in high repair costs. 
For example, one company was hired under the Mini-Repair Program (i.e. 
replac·ement of doors, windows, stairs, and electrical, plumbing and heating 
systems) to repair 1000 flood damaged homes in Wyoming Valley. Estimated cost 
of repair by the Corps of Engineers was $1.4 million. The company repaired 
only 808 homes and charged the federal government over $3.5 million. The 
company blamed the high costs on unforseen high prices for supplies and labor. 
- Imported labor was brought into the region. These ext ra costs were also 
included in the expenses of the company mentioned above. The expense sheet 
showed a cost of more than $400,000 for mobilization, which included flying in 
personnel from such far away places as Montana, Idaho, Cal i fornia and North 
Dakota as well as local living expenses and equipment costs (Philadelphia 
Inquirer, 1974; reported in Yancey, 1975), 
- Inspections made by the Corps of Engineers of houses repaired under the 
Mini-Repair Program showed poor qual ity workmanship. The work done by some 
contractors was so bad that they became known among Corps inspectors as the 
"Dirty Dozen." One such company bid on so many mini-repair contracts that it 
fell weeks behind its scheduled completion dates. Some of the contracts 
awarded to that company had to be taken away and given to other contractors, 
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thus compounding the delays and increased costs. 
1974; reported in Yancey, 1975). 
(Philadelphia Inquirer, 
- In the aftermath of Agnes, con men and flim-flam artists entered the 
disaster areas. They posed as contractors and offered to put houses back into 
shape. After a gullible or frantic homeowner made a down payment, the 
"contractor" would never return (Corp of Engineers, 1972). 
Comments 
These losses were distributed over a much larger area than one wou ld 
expect as the direct result of a dam-break flood. However, the sort of 
meteorological event that would generate hydrologic dam failure is also likely 
to cause dispersed flooding over a large area. One can speculate as to the 
marginal additional losses had a major dam in Pennsylvania failed during 
Agnes. 
The project pushed by Representative Yanik demonstrates a sort of "free 
loading" within past disaster politics. The Lake Erie problem is a continuing 
loss that is quite different than the sudden losses resulting from Agnes 
flooding in Pennsylvania. Yet, political trading lets others capitalize. One 
can expect a major disaster to place pressures on the Federal budget that far 
exceed relief and rehabilitation costs to the directly affected community as 
other areas also receive benefits through the political bargaining inherent in 
passing special legislation. 
IX. BUFFALO CREEK FLOOD, WEST VIRGINIA, FEBRUARY 1972 
Background 
The flood occurred on 26 February 1972. It resulted from the collapse of 
a coal mine waste dump that had become a dam storing the flows from Buffalo 
Creek. During a period of heavy rain, the waste heap collapsed without 
warning; 132 million gallons of water and sludge rushed down the l8-mile long 
valley of Buffalo Creek completely demolishing the first villages hit; 125 
people were killed and 4,000 of the areas 5,000 inhabitants were made homeless 
(Erikson, 1976a). 
Litigation was initiated by 625 survivors of the Buffalo Creek flood who 
refused to settle with the coal company claims office. In an out of court 
settlement, the survivors were awarded $13.5 million, $6 million of which was 
distributed on the basis of a point system as compensation for psychological 
damages (Stern, 1976). 
Results 
Disabling psychiatric symptoms such as anxiety, depression, 
character and lifestyle, and maladjustments and developmental 
children were still evident more than 2 years after the disaster 
of the people examined (Titchener and Kapp, 1976). 
changes 1.n 
problems in 
in over 90% 
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- Collective trauma (defined by Erikson, 1976a as a blow to the tissues of 
social 1 He that damages the bonds linking people together and impairs the 
prevailing sense of community) existed side by side with individual trauma at 
Buffalo Creek. This is reflected in the impact on the Buffalo Creek victims 
of the loss of their community (Erikson 1976b). Erikson, and Lifton and Olson 
(1976) felt that the placement policy in the refugee camps (first come-first 
severed with no regard for former neighborhood ties) contributed greatly to 
the disintegration individual (and family) social support systems from their 
communities. 
- Death or survivor guilt: the guilt of having survived while others perished 
and a feeling that one could have done more to help others (Lifton and Olson, 
1976) . 
- Death imprint and death anxiety: memories and images of the disaster 
associated with death, destruction and dying. This was often manifested by an 
acute fear 0 f rain and water. Afterwards, even minor rains generated 
irrational behavior to watch for floods (Lifton and Olson, 1976). 
Contributing Factors (Lifton and Olsen, 1976) 
- The suddenness of the disaster and absence of warning: 
estimated that during the fi rst 24 hours after the event, 
persons displaced by the water exhibited shock and incoherent 
Retie f workers 
88% of the 4000 
thinking. 
- Widespread losses: Virtually no one who lives in the valley was untouched 
by the flood. 
- The callousness of the Coal Company: The publ ic felt that the coal company 
was to blame for the accident and that they didn't care for anything except 
coal. 
- The continuing relationship of survivors to the company: Most people still 
worked at the mines harboring bitter resentment while at the same time being 
financially dependent on the company. 
- Community isolation: The area is geographically isolated and has been 
socially self-supporting. This meant that there was little external social or 
moral support to call on when the community broke down. 
Comments 
We are in times when court awards for "pain, suffering, mental anguish, 
psychological harm" far exceed direct medical payments. A "magnification ll 
factor calculated from the ratio of total awards to direct awards would 
greatly inflate losses. One could examine law cases and supporting literature 
on estimating these losses to build a basis for thinking about how these 
losses would multiply during a major disaster. Perhaps an "Act of God" 
reduces or eliminates legal responsibility, but the distinction between 
manmade and natural causes should have little effect on the suffering that 
actually occurs. 
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We also see in Buffalo Creek the impacts of destroying "community" support 
systems in an area where the people had no outside family or friends to turn 
to. In contrast, San Francisco was a new community where nearly everyone had 
the resort of going back "home". 
Also, Buffalo Creek people were largely dependent on a non-cash economy. 
They grew their food, traded services, helped each other out during times of 
trouble in the "pioneer" spirit of pitching in to rebuild a fire-destroyed 
home in a day as a community effort. Suddenly this entire support system was 
gone. One could probe the literature to analyze this as a "community" as 
opposed to "individual" trauma. 
X. RAPID CITY, SOUTH DAKOTA, FLOOD, JUNE 9, 1972 
White (1975) 
Severity 
- Torrential rains (more than half of the 24-inch annual average) over a 99-
square mile catchment caused surface runoff to cascade into the stream. Flows 
down the canyon carried trees, boulders, and buildings. Canyon Lake swelled 
in volume to ten times its normal 640 acre feet. Within 6 hours of the start 
of the rains, the Canyon Lake dam burst. 
Damages 
- 231 lives lost. 
- In December 1972, the Corps of Engineers estimated 635 buildings and 312 
trailers had been destroyed and that property damage amounted to $82 million. 
Congress 
Efforts by Representative James Abourezk (South Dakota) 
July 20, 1972 
- Rapid City had more than 1,000 jobs, upward of 5,000 homes and hundreds of 
businesses either completely destroyed or severely damaged. 
- He advocated lowering the interest rate on Small Business Administration 
disaster loans to 1%. 
- Sought some sort of grant or forgiveness of Loans. 
disaster loan may be forgiven. 
- Asking for up to 90% forgiveness of disaster loans. 
Presently $2,500 of 
- In Rapid City, a 90% forgiveness feature would cost the Government roughly 
$45 million--not even one third of what has been given to foreign governments 
for disasters in the last six years. 
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September 27, 1972 
- More than one foot of rain fell. 
- Dams broke. 
- Water crushed more than 1,000 homes. 
- 240 persons dead. 
- The flood cut a swath several blocks wide through the entire length of Rapid 
City. Homes, cars, trees, etc. were strewn along that path. 
- The dam is out and if heavy spring flooding occurs from all the snow that 
accumulates in the Black Hills in a typical South Dakota winter, the high flow 
will be repeated. 
- People of Rapid City have decided not to permit any development in that 
flood zone. The city will rebuild on safer, higher ground and place a park as 
a memorial to those who died and suffered where it would not be safe to locate 
businesses and homes. 
- Rapid City plans to use the Urban Renewal Program. 
million. 
- Property tax base has been dealt a devastating blow. 
Has applied for $87 
- Tourism did not materialize as people stayed away from Rapid City despite 
urgings to the contrary. 
- Loss is between 15-33%. 
- Unemployment remains high. Hundreds of bus inesses were lost in a town of 
43,000 people. 
Comments 
The Federal assistance programs do drive up prices by bringing more 
reconstruction money into the community than the local construction industry 
can assimilate, particularly in a city so isolated from others of its size. 
One wonders whether the feeling of loss presented by Congressman Abourezk 
continues 14 years later or whether the new and improved city after 
reconstruction is actually more thriving. 
XI. AUSTRALIAN FLOODS OF 1974: CASE STUDIES OF THE 
EFFECTS OF DISASTER ON HEALTH 
a. Richmond River Flood (Smith et al., 1980) 
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Background 
In March 1974, a laO-year flood on the Richmond River inundated the 
northern New South Wales town of Lismore causing major property damage and 
community disruption. Most shops were inundated to a depth of over 2.5 m (8.2 
ft) above floor level and about 400 houses (out of 1900 in the flood-prone 
area) were inundated to depths of up to 3 m (9.8 ft). 
Results 
After-the-flood studies documented several negative health effects: 
i. Smith et a1. (1979), (reported in Smith et a1., 1980) found that 8% of 
flooded households claimed that the flood had an adverse effect on health. 
Older people (over 45) or those with over 0.5 m 0.6 ft) of water in their 
homes were most affected. 
ii. Petroff and Leatch (1975) (reported in Smith et al., 1980) found that 
the flood precipitated an increase in outpatient attendances at their 
psychiatric clinic in Lismore. 
Ill. Further studies by Smith et a1. (980), showed that while the flood 
does not appear to have increased the number of hospital admissions or deaths, 
it may have affected the pattern of admissions especially among those whose 
houses were severely flooded (ie. had more than 1 m (3.3 ft) of water over the 
floor). In this group, the number of male admissions doubled while the number 
of female admissions halved. 
Although there was no overall change in total numbers of deaths, deaths 
from heart disease increased significantly in the year following the flood for. 
the whole of Lismore. No satisfactory explanation was found for this trend. 
b. Brisbane Flood 
Background 
According to Smith et a1. (980), in January 1974, a substantial 
proportion of Brisbane, including the business district was flooded. About 
13,000 dwellings were affected. 7,500 were flooded and nearly 100 were 
totally destroyed. 12 lives were lost. The population had no prior flood 
experience and was completely unprepared and did not comprehend the flood 
warnings issued. 
Results 
- No increase in mortality after the flood was observed. 
Significant increase was observed on the number of visits to general 
practlt10ners, hospitals, and specialists. Among those seeking medical care, 
the predominant symptoms were persistent psychological symptoms which include 
irritability, nervous tension and depression. 
- Consumption of sleeping tablets and psychotropic drugs rose. 
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- The impact of the floods on health was greatest for people over 35 years of 
age, probably because they were more likely to be householders. 
- Women under 65 years of age had more psychiatric symptoms than men, but this 
sex d i fferenc e disappeared in those over 65 years. The higher level of 
psychiatric symptoms in women is thought to be due to the fact that the 
housewife is confronted with the damage all day. The men are back at work. 
Comments 
Homes are an economic investment to which we acquire great personal 
attachment. Their sudden loss is a traumatic blow that women, who feel the 
primary responsibility in our society for their attractiveness, experience 
more deeply than men. 
XII. SAN FRANCISCO BAY REGION FLOODS OF JANUARY 1982 
As described by Brown (1982) 
Severity 
Twenty-five inches of rain in 32 hours dropped on the coastal mountains 
initiating many hundreds of debris flows. Debris consisted of mud, rock, and 
trees. Flowrates exceeded 10 ft per second and destroyed bridges, pipelines, 
communication networks and roads. Early estimates indicated a storm return 
period of over 100 years. Detailed analyses later indicated that at most 
locations rainfall amounts were 1- to 40-year range. 
Public property 
Private 
Homes damaged or 
destroyed 
Businesses 
Deaths 
Losses 
$109 * 106 
$172.4 * 106 
6,500 
1,000 
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Synergism 
- No regional flood warning system is available to provide real-time data on 
rainfall intensity and accumulated volumes and on corresponding stream flows. 
Rainfall amounts were found to be 150 to 250 percent above those forecast by 
the National Weather Service. 
- No regional central ized system exists for transmission of the data to 
emergency response centers for interpretation. 
- Despite abundant information about geologic and hydrologic hazard areas 
produced and distributed during the past two decades, local governments 
consistently permitted development in those areas during that time. 
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- Many flood control channels, bridges, culverts and other drainage systems 
proved inadequate to handle the combination of water and debris that resulted 
from the intense storms, even though the systems were designed to carry the 
volumes of water that actually occurred. 
- Debris control structures such as those found in Southern California, Japan, 
and Italy are virtually nonexistent in the San Franc isco region. Limited 
damage from earlier debris flows, the small number of places where debris 
flows occur repeatedly and the limited population on hillslopes and in canyons 
have apparently combined as factors against construction of debris basins or 
similar structures. 
Comments 
1. Flood frequency analysis depends on the parameter being analyzed. The 
parameter could be rain (over many time periods), flow, flood stage 
considering the accentuating effect of the debris, or damage. This complexity 
is often insufficiently reckoned into engineering design. 
2. The relatively large portion of the damages inflicted on publ ic 
property, part icularly when added to public responsibility for losses to 
private property, places a large financial burden that reduces services and 
values received from services for years. 
67 
APPENDIX II 
NOTES AND COMMENTS ON SUPPLEMENTAL READINGS 
1. Dam Safety 
Baecher et a1. (980) presented a procedure appl ying ut i lity theory, 
estimation of economics damages, and historical rates of dam failure in the 
low-probability/high-consequence (LP/HC) risk analysis of dam safety programs. 
Utility theory provides valuable baCkground for assessing dam-failure losses, 
but catastrophic losses impact individuals far beyond their most imaginative 
anticipations. The application should come through studies for helping people 
quant ify utility by communicat ion with computer graphics and studies for 
measuring utility at a larger scale from a community perspective. 
In his review of potential dam failures, Ayaswamy et a1. (974) state 
that as many as 200,000 fatalities could now be caused by a major dam failure 
in California. Pate-Cornell and Tagaras (1986) quote the U.S. Department of 
the Interior review of the proposed Auburn Folsom-South Central Valley Project 
as stating that a IIsudden and complete collapse of [Auburn] dam when the 
reservoir was fu 11 would imperial the lives of 750,000 persons. II Niehaus et 
al. (in Waller and Covello, 1984) make the case that engineering designs that 
reduce the expected value of losses often increase the potential for 
catastrophe. For example, aviation advances concentrate deaths in airplane 
accidents in a few large events and thus reduce high-probability/low 
consequence risks by accentuating LP/HC risks. In the same way, reservoir 
storage controls lesser flood events even whi le creating the possibility of 
much greater losses from a dam failure. 
A wide variety of issues that arise in LP/HC studies were discussed at a 
conference whose proceedings were edited by Waller and Covello (984). In 
addressing the uncertainties in est imating the probabil it ies of these rare 
events~ J. B. Russell (1984) reported that the conference consensus was that 
nno source of information should be overlooked if it can be used to more 
accurately assess the frequency of low-probability events. 1I Minarick and 
Kukielka (1984) emphasized the importance of precursor events and event chains 
that precede a catastrophe. Precursor sequences may be particularly important 
harbinger~ of synergistic factors. Ballestero et al. (1984) used this concept 
to partition raw extreme event data into subsets characterized by physical 
meteorological processes that lead to major storms. Distributions were fit to 
each subset and then aggregated. 
The effect of human error on losses experienced during low-probability 
events could be evaluated by using "human reliability analysis" in assessing 
system reliability and safety (Swain 1984). The Office of Nuclear Regulatory 
Research (1983) includes human error probabilities in its guide to performance 
of probabilistic risk assessments for nuclear power plants. The probabilities 
are based on tasks that are behaviorally similar in terms of cues, 
interpretations, response requirements, and responsibilities. Hall (984) 
discusses quantification of human performance drawn from experience in nuclear 
power plants. He states that cognitive errors occur through misdiagnosis of 
an off-normal event. Procedural errors are usually not severe unless multiple 
errors occur sequentially. 
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While experiences gathered from the nuclear power industry may be helpful 
in assessing human reliability, the human errors made by people caught in 
unexpected catastrophic events would be expected to be much greater than that 
by trained people regularly encountering hazardous situations in nuclear power 
plants. The subjects of human error in unfamiliar circumstances and the 
effect iveness of training in reducing human error during events that are 
unlikely to occur during a lifetime are worth investigating. 
It is difficult to assess the human contribution to "magnification" 
during events larger than any that have ever occurred in North America. 
However, one can speculate and novel ist scenarios may be the best medium to 
use. Vlachos (1977) discusses the use of scenarios in social impact 
assessment. 
Thompson and Parkinson (1984) discuss the unacceptability approach, which 
views risks that exceed a given degree of consequence to be strict ly 
unacceptable without regard to probability, This is based on the ethical 
principle that one is morally justified in risking only what one can afford to 
lose. 
Situation-specific indicators can be used to distinguish between high-
consequence/low-probabil ity risk and low-consequence/h i gh- probab iIi ty ri sk 
according to Thompson and Parkinson (1984), The standard indicators of death, 
injury, and property damage should be supplemented with 1) Community and 
Cultural Indicators, 2) Profitability Indicators (largely for low consequence 
risks), 3) Probability Indicators (largely for uncertainty), and 4) Exposure 
Indicators (classifying people according to perceived risk and ability of 
individuals to achieve long-term goals). 
Many people consider high-consequence risks to be of greater moral 
significance than the more familiar medium- and low-consequence risks. This 
attitude may grow out of a philosophical commitment to the unacceptability 
approach. LP/HC risk threatens not only lives but also the social, economic, 
and emotional support structures which bind people into a community. This 
logic would assign nations a still greater value. 
"The community represents a value perhaps above and beyond human life." 
(Thompson and Parkinson 1984, p. 559.) Points given to support this view are: 
1. A community is a thing of intrinsic value. 
a. A prerequ1s1te for any moral action. 
b. Basic needs and happiness are contingent upon the social and 
economic structures provided by the community. 
c. Such basic community forms as famiLy, friends, and church 
represent the highest fulfillment of human purpose. 
2. Loss of community causes suffering and mental anguish. liThe 
sudden loss of the entire system of support and society represents a 
severe emotional trauma for survivors of a tragedy." (Erikson 1976a). 
69 
3. Loss of community means a loss of institutions and artifacts of 
recognized cultural value. 
Meyer 0984, p. 338) states that "an external diseconomy may result from 
the imposition of catastrophic loss risks upon the neighbors of a facility 
potentially subject to a catastrophic accident." A large dam imposes such 
risks. 
Regulatory agencies are more risk adverse where many people are 
simultaneously at risk and require greater safety (Committee on Safety 
Criteria for Dams, 1985). "Federal guidelines for dam safety" (Committee on 
the Safety of Existing Dams, 1983) require preparation of an emergency action 
plan, commensurate with the dam size and location, based on a postulated dam 
failure and flood inundation maps. The plan should be coordinated with local 
civil-preparedness officials and cover notification, evacuation, stockpiling 
repair materials, and inventory, local repair forces, and training operating 
personnel. One caution is to avoid overlooking consequences at the 
catastrophic and super catastrophic scales. The plan itself can be effective 
during disaster only to make matters worse during catastrophes. 
The determinants of popular perceptions of riskiness should be 
identified. People have a clearer understand ing of the benefits and hazards 
associated with dams and are thus more willing to accept them than they are 
willing to accept nuclear power plants, for example. The perceptions of risk 
differ although the probabilities may be similar. "Actuarial knowledge of the 
fatality risks of dams does not readily clarify decisions concerning dam 
safety." (Baldewicz 1984, p. 81) 
There is a need to develop a theory of risk perception that predicts how 
people will respond to new hazards and management strategies. (S lovic 1984) 
Two goals are to improve communications of policy-makers with the lay public 
and to structure effective educational efforts. 
2. Repair Cost Escalation 
Yancey (975) explored 15 factors for use in determining whether repair 
costs escalate after a catastrophe. The four principal ones were found to be: 
a) The amount of direct damage measured in dollars. 
b) The capacity of the local construction industry measured by the 
dollars worth of construction annually within the market area. The larger the 
construction activity, the greater is the potential to supply the increased 
repair requirements resulting from a natural disaster. The regional annual 
volume of contract construction in dollars can be used to index local 
construction capacity. 
c) Unemployed labor force measured 
unemployed would draw if they had jobs. The 
of local construction workers, the greater 
increased demands. 
in the monthly wages that the 
greater the level of unemployment 
is the local potential to supply 
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d) Income distribution: After a disaster, individuals with higher 
incomes are more concerned about repairing their property quickly than they 
are with repair prices. On the other hand, the poor cannot afford high repair 
costs and can only wait until the prices come back down or ask the government 
or some other group to finance the necessary repairs. Knowledge of the 
fractions of the affected population with incomes in various brackets thus 
provides an indication of cost escalation potential. 
3. Health Impacts 
Health impacts increase with the severity of the flood experience. Logue 
(1978) and Melick (1976) found that persons whose homes had been flooded 
perceived a more serious effect on their health than others in the same 
community whose homes were not flooded. The physiological wear-and-tear on 
peop le exper ienc ing the flood ing of their homes reduces natural defenses 
against illness. The flood group is more likely to be forced out into the wet 
and cold, has greater economic concerns that may inhibit seeking help, 
postpones attending to health problems, and is sicker when they finally seek 
health care. 
Parker (1977) reports that 25% of victims questioned 10 weeks after a 
tornado reported deterioration in physical health, but only 11% indicated this 
after 14 months had passed. Takuma (1978) reported that many earthquake 
victims complained of ill health after the quake, but the number decreased 
over a 7-week period. Faich and Rose (1979) found that hospital admissions 
for myocardial infarction increased and mortality from all causes, especially 
ischemic heart disease, increased in the five days following a blizzard. 
Studies of postflood populations found longer durations of illnesses (Melick, 
1976), and increased numbers of visits to general practitioners and hospitals 
for a year following the flood (Abrahams, et aI, 1976). 
4. Psychological Impacts 
Disasters may generate such psychological reactions as acute grief, 
anxiety, anger, hostility, resentment, depression, and loss of ambition among 
adults. Marital and family discord, increased use of tranquilizers and 
psychoactive medications, and excessive alcohol consumption have been 
observed. Children develop phobias, reoccurring sleep disturbances and 
nightmares, and a lack responsibility. They lose interest in school. 
Green et al. (985) found in a long-term study of psychological 
impairment of survivors of the Beverly Hills supper club fire that differences 
in an individual's experiences during the fire were significantly predictive 
of their later psychological functioning. Experiences such as bereavement, 
life-threatening, extent of danger, time waiting to know status of friend or 
loved one, and helping search and rescue affected the primary stress response 
symptoms such as depres s ion, anxie ty, sleeplessness, social isolation, 
suicide, substance abuse, hostility, or belligerence. Persons experiencing 
bereavement or life-threatening experience showed more symptoms one year after 
the fire than at two years. Those experiencing searching and waiting 
experiences maintained symptoms over a longer time, because of their. prolonged 
uncertainty about the impact of experience. Prolonged uncertainty of such 
events as Three Mile Island also was shown to predict long-term impairment. 
71 
One would also expect repair cost escalation to add to the mental 
anguish. People are forced to choose, for themselves and their families, 
between continuing discomfort or paying for repairs at perceived exorbitant 
cost s. They have to deal with people of poor reputation or maybe just 
different cultural roots. They may be taken economically while their personal 
finances are at low ebb. 
Accord ing to a report in Science News (1985), peop Ie li ving near Mount 
St. Helens were still suffering emotional problems due to the volcano's 
eruption five years earlier. Residents suffering significant property loss or 
personal loss were nearly 12 times more likely than others to experience a 
psychiatric disorder, and rates of mental disorders among women who 
experienced such losses were about twice as high as for men. The intensity of 
their reactions decreased in the second and third years after the eruption. 
The major impact was caused by the flood which occurred as a result of the 
eruption. Another study showed increased mental disorders and stress 
responses among residents in a town covered with volcanic ash. Their stress 
reactions lasted at least seven months. 
Logue (1978) found that, five years after Hurricane Agnes, emotional and 
physical distress lasted about a year longer with flood victims than in a 
control group. 
six months after the accident at Three Mile Island, nuclear plant workers 
showed psychophysiological symptoms, anger, and extreme worry, primarily among 
nonsupervisory workers, and especially those having preschool children (Sills 
et aI, 1982). An NRC survey (Flynn, 1979) found symptoms of stress including 
overeating, loss of appetite, difficulty in sleeping, feeling trembly or 
shaky, trouble thinking clearly, irritability, and outbursts of extreme anger 
which diminished over time. 
T~tchener and Kapp (1976) state that more than 80% of a group of 
survivors of the Buffalo Creek flood showed a traumatic neurotic syndrome, and 
the symptoms and resulting character changes persisted for months, even years 
after. Almost all reported anxiety, grief, and despair. The anxiety later 
led to obsessions and phobias about water, wind, rain, and other reminders 
that the disaster could reoccur. Not only have individuals been traumatized, 
but the entire community. 
Erikson (1976) states that loss of communality resulting from the Buffalo 
Creek flood has impaired individuals' recovery as well. Survivors not only 
suffer demoralization because of personal loss, but because they have lost 
their or perceive they have lost most of their moral anchors. They were 
scattered throughout the valley when relocated and felt great suspicion to 
their new neighbors. They perceive that relative strangers are less moral 
than famB iar neighbors. They suspec t breakdowns in morality such as 
increased use of alcohol, that outsiders have not been able to substantiate. 
Their sense of disorientation has continued for years after the disaster, 
which is uncommonly long. 
Erikson suggests this exceptional response occurred because the survivors 
had few individual resources to cope because they had for so long used their 
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abilities for the community, and didn't know how to use them for their own 
needs. The community was stronger than the individuals. It lost the quality 
that gave power to the individuals to care, console, and protect each other in 
disaster. 
Gibbs and Levine (1982) discusses the long-term effects of stress from 
the presence of a chronic hazard, namely toxic wastes from a landfill. The 
residents of Love Canal were evacuated several times, lost most of their 
possessions due to fear of contamination, and forced to live in college 
dormitories and motel s for extended period s. Children exhibited behavioral 
problems and marriages were strained. There was fear of chromosomal damage, 
cancer and other health problems from exposure to toxics. President Carter 
signed a bill to evacuate the families permanently from Love Canal due to 
mental anguish. 
Kinston and Rosser (1974) state that during the threat phase preceding a 
disaster there seems to be a universal denial of the potential disaster as an 
attempt to adapt to an unnatural situation. They site cases where evacuation 
was minimal, such as the Hawaiian tsunami of May, 1960. By not acknowledging 
the threat, they avoid physical inconvenience and psychic distress. 
During the init ial impact, the first major shock is to the individual, 
whose feeling of personal invulnerability is suddenly reversed. A second 
major shock follows when the amount of destruction is realized. Reactions 
swing between terror and elation, invulnerability and helplessness, 
abandonment and escape. Their subsequent recovery from this shock depends on 
whether the disaster was a "near miss" or a "remote miss", and on the actual 
amount of loss experienced. Panic is very rare, rather feelings of 
helplessness or bewilderment, docility, and indecisiveness, among others, 
which is the "disaster syndrome". 
During the recoil after first impact, people often react with 
hyperactivity, loss of efficiency, irrational behavior, and otherwise obtain 
emotional release. They are often obsessively preoccupied with the personal 
implications of the event. 
During the early aftermath fear and apprehension often persist, often due 
to the idea that the disaster will reoccur (such as aftershocks in an 
earthquake). New disasters are fantasied and rumors rapidly spread, often 
with the aid of the media. 
Survivors have difficulty mourning their dead unless they know the bodies 
have been identified, and their attempts to find missing persons often 
interfere with relief operations. 
The memory of the disaster persists, with the survivors often forced to 
relive it over and over again. Often they feel regrets or recriminations over 
actions taken before or during the disaster. 
There are some therapeut ic fac tors in the d isas ter, such as the relief 
that threats and dangers come from the outside. The immediate needs are 
obvious, immediate, and generally physical, such as food and shelter. Danger, 
loss, and suffering are public and immediately present, so past and future are 
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unimportant, and survivors who are not so badly affected feel relatively less 
deprived. 
Initially, people tend to give or accept help without restraint, but this 
is followed by feelings of hostility, greed, suspicion, envy, and competition. 
They resent relief organizations which give compensation based on need, not 
losses. 
Following destruction, people prefer to move back and rebuild. This 
seems to be due to feelings of fate, feelings that such events are random 
occurrences, and that leaving will cause further disaster. People may also 
wish to repair the damage and master the event, or refuse to be scared away. 
Very few move away, and those who do tend to for "neurot ic" reasons. 
Melick et al (1982) discuss some characteristics and mediating variables 
affecting the individual's reaction to disaster. Whether a disaster is 
natural or man-made, some events are accepted by victims as acts of God. 
However, in other cases victims attach blame to someone or something, for 
example the Bu ffalo Creek flood, Love Canal, and Three Mi le Island. They 
suggest that preventable disasters (such as a dam break due to human 
negligence) may be more stressful than nonpreventable events. 
The time factor associated with the impact of the disaster and recovery 
is important with respect to the potential effect on the survivors' health. 
Victims of Hurricane Agnes felt that the recovery period was about 18 months. 
For an event such as Love Canal, where the threat was present for a much 
longer period, long-term effects may endure much longer. 
It is also important to distinguish between losses resulting from damages 
that can be measured objectively and the stresses perceived during the event. 
The Buffalo Creek flood had major impacts in both categories. Three Mile 
Island resulted in little objective loss but high perceived stress. 
Ocher factors include whether the community is prepared for the event, 
perhaps due to earlier disasters, whether evacuation is carried out on a large 
scale, and whether the event seems to have an irrevocable effect on the 
victim's life, such as Love Canal. 
Carver and Scheier (1981) suggest that the relationship between prior 
performances and future expectancies depends on whether the outcomes are 
cont ingent on fac tors the person controls. "Increments in expectancies 
(following successes) or decrements in expectancy (following failure) were 
greater and more frequent when the task was described as skill based than when 
the task was described as chance based. • prior performances affected 
expectancies of future performances only when the outcomes were bel ieved to 
have been determined internally." p. 189. 
These outcome expectanc ies affect the way a person reacts to hazards. 
People who perceive a discrepancy between a hazard and acceptable 
environmental risk attempt to reduce the discrepancy if they have any hope of 
success. If their expectancies are unfavorable, people attempt to physically 
withdraw from the situation. If that is not possible, they may have a sort of 
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mental withdrawal as they think about other things, refuse to cons ider the 
hazard further, and avoid any reminders. 
Carver and Scheier (1981) also emphasize that a person's outcome 
expectancy determines his or her emotional reaction. If a favorable 
expectancy is viewed as a product of personal effort or abil ity, heightened 
self-esteem results. If it is viewed as resulting from outside help from 
others or by luck, gratitude follows. On the negative side, an expectancy 
seen as a result of a person's own inadequacies or fail ings lowers sel f-
esteem. If the expectancy is perceived as caused by others, frustrations 
commonly lead to anger and resentment. Disasters are negative, and both of 
these last two responses are commonly reported among their victims. 
From these initial reactions, the feedback loops of control theory can be 
extended to longer run applications to anxiety-related behavior. In the 
context of this study, one can consider the effects of the impact of a dam-
break flood on behavior through the aftermath and recovery periods. Results 
of two studies suggest that self-focus increases awareness of fear or anxiety 
cues and interrupts normal activities. Responses to these interruptions seem 
to be determined by the person's outcome expectancy. "Even with fear salient, 
if expectancies are positive, the result is renewed efforts and concentration 
on the goal. If expectancies are negative, however, interruption leads to 
withdrawal." p. 241. 
Also, fears or anxieties lead to earlier withdrawal by persons who 
perceive negative outcomes and tend to increase efforts by confident persons 
with positive outcome expectancies. Thus, anxiety or fear can be facilitating 
or debilitating. However, some level of fear probably becomes debilitating 
for even confident people." although we have not experimentally 
addressed the possibility, it may be that even relatively high levels of 
anxiety are facilitating for people who are very confident." p. 228. 
If people with low outcome expectancies cannot physically withdraw from a 
hazard situation, they tend to experience mental withdrawal into thoughts or 
perceptions irrelevant to their surroundings. This reduces their performance 
or usefulness as functioning members of society. They work halfheartedly and 
are easily interrupted by physical anxiety cues or frustrations in their 
tasks. Poor outcomes reinforce perceptions of an unfavorable expectancy, 
cause further withdrawal, and lead people to focus on task-irrelevant 
information. One empirical data source for further work in this area would 
be to study reactions and behavior during and after a catastrophic dam 
failure. 
5. Preventative Response 
There seem to be conflicting signals in the literature on how hazard 
experience affects the performance of subsequent mitigation measures. In 
invest igat ing the rel at ionsh i p be tween att itudes towards hurricanes and 
hurricane adjustments, Baker and Patton (1974) found that experience with past 
hazards was strongly related to successful preventative actions. (Comment: 
probably also to reduced personal and community trauma. In fact one could 
hypothesize trauma and lack of training as the primary contributors to 
inefficient actions during catastrophes.) 
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Saarinen (1979) discusses the linkage between prior hazard experience and 
subsequent mit igation measures. People can be mis led by limited or biased 
experience. Saarinen uses an example to illustrate this point. 
"In investigations following Hurricane Camille, which struck the 
Mississippi Coast in 1969, it was found that many people assessed their safety 
according to memories of an earlier smaller storm which stuck in 1947. This 
may have been a fatal mistake for many as most among the 123 dead were drowned 
while trying to ride out the storm in a residence near the water front." (p. 
2, 1979). (Comment: In our terminology, disaster experiences may lull people 
into complacency against subsequent catastrophe.) 
Carter, Clar.k and Leik (1979), in a study of response to hurricane 
warnings, found that prior experience with hazard situations did not enhance 
either preparedness or evacuation under warning. In a later study, Carter 
(1979) found that people without hurricane experience evacuate earl ier than 
those who have experienced a hurricane. The latter group waits for firm 
confirmat ion of the necessity for evacuation. Clark and Carter (1980) note 
that experience with hurricanes raises "threshold" levels, that is, the body 
of evidence required before one is satisfied that evacuation is necessary. 
(Connnent: Experiences may also include realization of event magnitude 
variability, unnecessary evacuations, personal or neighbor losses to looters, 
or difficulties in returning to implement repairs.) 
The logic generally used in setting policy for government programs to 
help to infl uence people exposed to natural hazards is (Baumann and Sims, 
1980): 1) provide information on the risk and education on proper mitigation 
measures; 2) such information will make the public under threat aware of the 
nature of the risk and the opt ions that they have for doing something to 
reduce their losses; and 3) such awareness will result in the public under 
threat adopting protective measures. Records of past events indicate that is 
does not necessarily follow that distributed information will cause the public 
to know what to do and do what it should. Reasons for breakdown in this 
conventional logic are given by Saarinem (1979) and Mi1eti et al. (1975). 
In studying the warning systems for tornadoes, flash floods and 
hurricanes, Carter (1979) found that at least one-third of the public does not 
automatically follow official announcements. However, 90 percent will 
evacuate if they are convinced an event is serious. Hence a major task of a 
warning system is to convince skeptics. In interviewing families who were 
ultimately evacuated in the 1965 Denver floods, Drabek and Stephenson (1971) 
found that many of them interpreted the official broadcast warnings simply as 
"information." They felt that something as serious as the need to evacuate 
would be personally connnunicated to them in some way other than by radio or 
TV. Baumann and Sims (1980) have provided some insights and directions on 
warnings: 
1. The warning must be clear; 
2. The warning must convey an appropriate response; 
3. The warning must be perceived as coming from a credible source; 
4. The warning must be reinforced socially at the local level; 
5. The medium used to disseminate the warning is important; and, 
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6. The type of appeal must be considered and assessed. 
Quarantelli and Dynes (1972) discuss common beliefs and perceptions about 
social behavior during natural disasters which do not appear to be valid, but 
which are often considered when officials are planning for anticipated 
disasters. 
a. Panic flight. Due to fears of people panicking, officials put out 
warning bulletins cautiously or at the last minute. Media often reports 
entire communities fleeing on approach of a flood or hurricane. Actually the 
majority of inhabitants usually do not leave - it is usually tourists and 
transients who flee. Also most evacuations are orderly, with people helping 
others to get away. In the face of a flood threat in Denver in 1965, 92% of 
families who left together. 
In evacuating Three Mile Island an estimated 74 to 90% stayed with 
friends and relatives. The median distance traveled was 85 to 100 miles. 
About 180 stayed at the official evacuation center during one day, although as 
many as 800 may have stayed there for a short time. At one time, there were 
more reporters than evacuees at the center (Sills et al. 1982). 
During Hurricane Carla in 1961, over 500,000 people left their homes, but 
although there was at least four days warning, most residents never left their 
home. About 35% stayed in their homes and 22 percent wi th fr iend sand 
relatives. In a New England city hit by two hurricanes in succession, only 
about 4% evacuated. 
U.S. News and World Report (1985) report that people along the coast 
tended to stay in their homes during hurricanes until Camille killed 256 in 
1969. Since then most states passed mandatory evacuat ion laws that allowed 
police to arrest the foolhardy. During Hurricane Elena, officials in 
Louisiana ordered evacuations three times over a four-day period with most of 
the population responding. Fewer than 15 out of 1500 inhabitants of Dauphin 
Island, Alabama, refused to move the mainland. It has been hit by three 
hurricanes in the last 16 years, and inhabitants continue to rebuild. 
b. Shock. Only in a minority of cases do victims exhibit a shock 
reaction, usually apathy. This is generally short-lived and only seems to 
occur in the aftermath of sudden, violent disaster. 
c. Help. Disaster victims react immediately to their plight, first 
seeking help from family and friends, then from churches or other similar 
groups. If not available, then victims seek help from more impersonal 
official organizations, police or welfare departments. Only as a last resort 
do they turn to the Red Cross or civil-defense agencies. 
Quarantel1i and Dynes (1972) found that during the 1971 earthquake in San 
Fernando, California, when over 80,000 had to evacuate homes downstream of 
weakened dams, fewer than 7% sought housing aid from public agencies. During 
the large evacuation preceding Hurricane Carla, more than 75% went to other-
than-public shelters. In a flood in Yuba City and Marysville, California, 
less than 20% went to the 38 Red Cross shelters available in 13 towns in the 
disaster area. 
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d. During the 1953 tornado in Flint, Michigan, persons in the disaster 
area rescued and took to hospitals between 2/3 and 3/4 of the over 900 
casualties within three to four hours and without significant aid from formal 
organizations. Even in large disasters, most victims never come in contact 
with outside agencies. 
e. Outside agencies tend to underestimate local resources and flood a 
disaster area with unneeded supplies. There are usually more than enough 
volunteers, so much so that they cannot be effectively used. This often 
overwhelming response of volunteers from outside the immediate disaster area 
is known as convergence. 
f. There is very little evidence that wide-scale looting occurs. 
However, most victims perceive that looting occurs, even when it cannot be 
substantiated. This is due to rumors - They heard of others' property being 
stolen. 
g. Time. In the initial period after disaster, differences of class, 
rank, and age are unimportant as people work side by side to rescue injured 
and clear debris. Morale may be high. People compare their losses to others' 
losses and to what might have happened. However, the heightened sense of 
communi ty creates a wall that excludes outsiders with needed ski lls and 
reso·urces such as Red Cross rescue teams. 
i. The media tend to exaggerate disaster impacts. Orderly evacuations 
are reported as persons fleeing in near-panic. Officials usually overestimate 
losses of life and property. Reports focus on destruction and despair or on 
unusually tragic aspects, which may be true but are not representative. In 
the Alaska earthquake, initial est imates circulating in Columbus Ohio were 
1000 dead in Anchorage alone; Chicago papers estimated 500 dead; in Seattle it 
was 300; and in Anchorage it was 100. The actual number of deaths was 7. 
Danzig et al (1958) studied the effect of a threatening rumor on a 
community which experienced a major flood. After flood waters receded, 
people returned to their homes to clean up. A day after a rumor that water 
was coming over the dam upstream was received over the radios on the fire-
trucks used to pump out residences and was rapidly spread by word-of-mouth and 
phone. Nearly a third of those who heard the rumor fled, with 90% of those 
who lived in the area of town already flooded. Officials delayed action until 
it was verified false, and then transmitted the news to local radio stations 
and directly to the public. Several denials of the rumor had to be broadcast 
before people would return. 
j . 
heroic. 
decency. 
Disaster victims like to pass off their experiences as atypical and 
Stories of loot ing and exploitat ion reinforce their own sense of 
They act as a necessary counterpoint to the reality of the event. 
The psychological impact of disaster may be minimized by a willingness to 
admit the possibility of the disaster occurring yet also maintain a belief in 
survival. Anticipation or worrying about the coming event can reduce the risk 
of being overwhelmed by the event. 
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Green et al (1985) suggest that a person's individual disaster experience 
is a good indicator of future psychological functioning ~ while Pearl in and 
Schooler (1978) have identified factors which predict how persons will cope 
with stress. Those with higher education and income show better coping 
ability, probably because they have access to more effective coping 
techn iques. Men do better than women ~ for personality characteristics and 
response repertoires shown to have some effect in controlling stress are found 
predominantly in men. No significant overall difference was found between 
young and old. 
This information may be used predicted reactions to risk before an event, 
allowing identification of persons likely to need clinical care, or be used to 
predict mental health outcomes for specific events. 
Kinston and Rosser (974) suggest that specialized psychiatric skills 
could be useful in all phases of a disaster. This is rarely done and 
interventions by psychiatrists are actively resisted in the early phases by 
other helpers and by the victims in the later phases. It is not known what 
priority psychiatric help should have relative to other relief. However in 
Yugoslavia the psychological impact of disaster is considered in planning 
relief services. 
Apart from convent ional methods for treatment of individuals, there is 
not much information on special problems in treating on the corrnnunity level 
where there is prevalent death, disablement, material loss, and bereavement. 
The authors feel that an obvious ro Ie for psychiatrists would be to set up 
groups to help the community work through its shared experiences 
constructively. 
Kinston and Rosser (974) also suggest that all responsible persons 
involved in disaster relief should understand psychological first-aid in order 
to establish effective human contact with disturbed or upset survivors. 
Separations of loved ones should be prevented. To minimize confusion, 
anxiety, and guilt, processes such publishing lists of dead and injured, 
establishing effective communication and information centers, and que 11 ing 
rumors must be accelerated. Also, compet it ion between reI forgan izat ions 
should be dealt with quickly. This will reduce the often experienced 
hostility of victims to relief agencies. 
Omohundro (1982) found that after an oil spill in the St. Lawrence River, 
residents were as disturbed by the lengthy cleanup as they were by the 
pollutant itself. When asked what aspect of the spill they found most 
upsetting~ 24% of the answers concerned quality of the cleanup, the money 
spent, the leaders of the cleanup, and other items directly related to the 
relief operation, while only 14% mentioned factors related directly to the 
pollution of the environment. There was much overlapping and gaps in federal, 
state, and local government organizat ions involved result ing in con fus ion 
about responsibility. Elected officials and government agencies received the 
most negative rating of oil spill participants from respondents. Providing 
and man a gin g pu b I i c in form a t ion was a c r it i c a I but d i f fi cuI t t ask, 
consequences included conflicting perceptions, rumor epidemics, incorrect 
referrals for information, and ultimately a decline in morale. 
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Due to the fact that it is important to respond to oil spills with 
maximum speed, the relief agencies generally act independently of the oil 
spill society. Thus, victims become alienated from the relief agency that is 
supposed to help them. The Coast Guard was often blamed for many of the 
difficulties, even for the accident itself. The Coast Guard was in charge of 
almost all available compensation to the victims and were suspected of 
arbitrary judgments, using biased criteria, and bending to political pressure. 
This created feelings of hostility and anger in the victims. 
Barton (1969) discusses the capacity of formal organizations to deal with 
the great amount of decision and administrative work in the aftermath of a 
disaster. In several cases ad hoc groups were set up to bypass local 
government and coordinate the efforts of outside relief organizations, local 
offices, and volunteers. (Comment: These plans seem oriented toward a local 
disaster than the catastrophes and supper catastrophes examined here. Many of 
the same prine iples apply, but greater geograph ic al se para t ion wou ld be 
preferable. We should also give greater thought to the susceptibility of 
computer software and data banks to the types of forces leashed by natural 
disaster. How should these be stored for better protection?) 
6. Disaster Planning by Businesses 
Dissmeyer (1983) describes the management response to a fire that gutted 
the Norwest Bank building in Minneapolis on Thanksgiving Day 1982. By 
implement ing a disaster cont ingency plan devised months before, all vital 
records were preserved intact. Basic services were provided to the public the 
next day, and all major functions were brought back to normal within a week, 
although they were housed in temporary quarters. An article in Management 
Review (1983) states that the cost of preparing the contingency plan for the 
Norwest Bank was about $27,000. 
A management policy committee oversaw everything. Copies of transaction 
data were transferred daily to an operations center several blocks away, and 
another backup system kept dupl icates of these. Vendors flew in replacement 
equipment (microcomputers, word processors, commun icat ions gear, etc.) over 
the weekend. Customers were informed through the media of alternate locations 
for banking services. Some 300,000 square feet of temporary office space was 
located and leased. 
The authors recommend the following contingency plan features: 
Prepare for a wide range of disasters - earthquake, flood, fire, tornado, 
power failure, civil disorders. 
Preserve the integrity of the processes, not just individual items, and 
make sure that departmental plans fit together. 
Have sufficient detail so key managers know who does what and how to 
reach them. 
Spell out priorities as ranked by someone or a committee. 
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Involve every department from the ear 1 iest stages when formulat ing the 
plan. 
Update the plan regularly. 
(Comment: These descript ions fit disasters better than catastrophes as 
being considered here. One can wonder what additional features would be added 
for dealing with a true catastrophe.) 
Colby (1985) quotes John Nugent, senior consultant at Norwest Bank, as 
stating that a Texas study showed that, of companies which experience 
disaster, 43% never reopen, and 29% of those who do reopen are closed again 
within 2 years. Some 95% of the businesses having disaster recovery plans 
failed to test them in advance. Norwest spent $55,000 to get paper documents 
cleaned by a salvage vendor. 
The Office of the Comptroller of Currency issued Banking Circular 177 in 
1983 required the CEO and directors of each national bank to have contingency 
plans and evaluate them annually for adequacy. The outcome is to be recorded 
annually in the minutes of the annual meeting. Campbell (1985) credits the 
Norwest fire and the power blackout in New York in 1983 as events causing 
bus iness managers nat ionwide to th ink seriously about disaster cont i ngency 
planning. 
John Nugent (personal communicat"ion) stated that a recent survey by Chubb 
and Sons Insurance Company showed that 91% of the businesses that suffered a 
data processing center disaster went out of business within five years. Also, 
the Management Information Systems Research Center at the University of 
Minnesota performed a study in 1978 on the effect of a data processing center 
disaster on various types of businesses. Banks had a tolerance level of only 
2 days without data processing facilities before they experienced a 
significant loss of business. Insurance companies could tolerate 4 weeks to a 
month, and manufacturing industries fell in between. 
Campbell describes three necessary levels of protection: 
1. Identification of the major business functions so that provision can 
be made for continuing each one with minimum disruption. 
2. Regular technical backup of important business information by 
duplicating files and databases and arranging for a standby facility to 
provide processing during an emergency or disaster. Using microcomputers 
complicates baCkup and recovery, since most data and software ~s not 
properly safeguarded for baCkup. 
3. Planning to preserve the major networking-hardware (automatic teller 
machines; fund transfer mechanisms; brokerage services; voice, data, and 
facsimile communications). 
From the general management perspective, a business should examine the 
potential impact of the disaster on revenue loss, additional expenses, loss of 
customer confidence, and legal liabilities. Also, many banks use other banks, 
financial service organizations, or service bureaus to support their business; 
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and these may become unavailable. Banks generally show a high level of 
interest but so far most contingency plans are confined to the technical 
aspects of computer processing. Their lack of concern for major business 
func t ions show a sc al ing weakness analogous to governments that review 
potential damages to their facilities but give lesser consideration to 
preserving their fundamental functions. 
Comment: These plans seems more oriented toward a local disaster than 
the catastrophes and super catastrophes examined here. Many of the same 
principles apply, but greater geographical separation would be preferable. We 
should also give greater thought to the suscept ibil ity of computer so ftware 
and data banks to the types of forces leased by natural disaster. How should 
these be stored for better protection? 
The ABA Banking Journal (1985) discusses two disasters striking 
individual banks. A tornado destroyed a bank in Barneveld, Wi sconsin on a 
Friday. A banker. from a neighboring town called vendors and fellow bankers 
and over the weekend gathered resources so that the bank could open on Monday 
for business in a rented trailer. 
The second case concerned a bank in Galveston hit by a hurricane in 1983. 
When a hurricane standby was issued, outside signs were removed, generators 
checked, and inventory taken of emergency items such as flashlights. When a 
hurricane warning was issued, computers were shut down, windows taped, and 
safe deposit boxes oiled to prevent rusting due to high humidity. 
Advertising Age (985) reports earthquake impacts on Mexican business. 
Tourism was hard hit by travelers' anxieties. Ad agencies were hurt as 
clients cut back advertising budgets in order to rebuild. Newspapers 
temporarily lost revenues from movie ads amount to 2 or 3 full pages daily. 
Most of the ad agencies are U. S. controlled or dominated, and the U. S. home 
offices organized relief efforts. 
Chemical Week (983) discusses the effect of a flood in Louisiana on 
shippers. Shipments were delayed a day or more because a major railroad 
trestle was washed away and flood-swollen rivers slowed barge progress and 
raised tow rates. Railroa~s had to reroute, and delays caused extra charges 
there too. Chemical feedstocks were brought in by truck as the major roads 
were still open, but highway transport is much more costly. 
Industry Week (1982) discusses southern Italy's attempt to rebuild after 
the Naples earthquake caused significant damage to 1449 businesses with 100 or 
more employees. There is hope of a rebirth of industry including advanced 
plants in energy, light transport, and telecommunications. 
Signi ficant natural disasters seem to inspire a higher concern for 
disaster contingency planning by businesses. After major hurricanes and 
earthquakes, business and industrial journals often publish articles on 
emergency preparedness and planning. An articles in Factory (1961) discusses 
the lessons learned in the aftermath of Hurricane Carla. Some large 
manufacturers, such as Westinghouse, had workers flown in from other parts of 
the country (New York and Denver, in Westinghouse's case) to aid in cleanup 
and recovery of vital equipment. They also obtained equipment and replacement 
parts from large 
West inghouse sent 
away for repair. 
storm struck. 
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equipment manufacturers before the hurricane struck. 
motors to 20 different shops located as far as 300 miles 
They also made commitments to such service shops before the 
An article in Iron Age (Starin 1962) suggests utilizing retired workers 
for fill-in duties, providing alternate headquarters, establishing reporting 
centers for employees away from plants, and joining mutual aid associations 
for pooling equipment and personnel. Weimer (977) also suggests that any 
contingency plan should include mechanisms to provide local officials with 
ready estimates of damages and the portion not covered by insurance in order 
to justify state or federal assistance. 
Davis (1973), in an article prompted by Hurricane Agnes, tells of a free 
course offered by the Defense civil Preparedness Agency in industry and 
business emergency planning. He also urges that businesses' emergency plans 
become a part of the community emergency plans and that they get involved with 
the community planning. 
7. Rebuilding and Relocation 
Kinston and Rosser (1974) state that following destruction, people prefer 
to move back and rebuild. Very few move away, and those who do tend to for 
"neurotic" reasons. Examples include Managua, now rebuilt for the third time 
after earthquakes destroyed it. Th is seems to be due to feelings of fate, 
feelings that such events are random occurrences, and that leaving will cause 
further disaster. People may also wish to repair the damage and master the 
event, or refuse to be scared away (or preserve social relationships, e.g. 
Buffalo Creek). 
Nineteen percent of all respondents to an NRC survey (Flynn, 1979) said 
they had considered moving (30% within a five-mile radius). However, as of 
end of July, 1979, less than three-tenths of 1 percent had moved due to the 
accident. Many families report stress and continuing threat, but few are so 
concerned as to relocate. 
A report in U.S. New & World Report (985) states that for most 
communities hit by a natural disaster, it takes only a year or two to rebuild 
completely. According to James Morentz, author of Hazard Monthly, a journal 
on disaster relief, local and private funds typically provide two to three 
times more aid than the federal government. Fort Wayne, Indiana, hit by 
flooding in 1982, implemented flood-control measures while rebuilding and when 
hit by a major flood in 1985, suffered little damage. In Johnstown, PA, 
however, hit by a flood in 1977, relief efforts suffered from duplication and 
disorganization, causing resentment among victims. Some areas may never come 
back. The Brownwood subdivision in Baytown, Texas, hit by Hurricane Alice in 
1983 was hit so badly it had to be abandoned. 
During World War II, most of Warsaw was destroyed. Ciborowski (1964) 
writes that of 957 historical buildings, 782 were completely demolished, 141 
part ially destroyed, and 34 remained. An important provis ion in the plan to 
rebuild Warsaw stated that all destroyed monuments of the past and relics of 
material and cultural progress, such as churches, cathedrals, the Royal 
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Palace, and the Old Town were to be restored, at the same time adapting them 
to modern ways of living. Berlin's central areas, including most of the slum 
districts, were also hard hit during war time bombing. Modern, safe housing 
was rebuilt, and new factories as well (Armstrong, 1973) 
Rebuilding is not always for the better. Torry (1978) cites the case of 
Managua, Nicaragua, where thousands of low and middle-income houses were built 
with help of outside aid. Due to credit bottlenecks and skyrocketing prices 
uncontrolled by officials, most of poor could not afford to buy them so many 
stood empty. Houses were undesirable to middle-income because of location, 
small size, and repetitive rows of houses. 
This phenomenon has occurred in urban renewal attempts. Hays (1985) 
reports that there was great pressure from opponents to public housing to 
locate new units in areas already occupied by the poor, putting a stigma on it 
which was further increased by construction of new projects in slum areas. 
Any family with ambitions of upward mobility would avoid "the projects", even 
though the rent was cheap. Therefore the most economically deprived and those 
attracted to the projects as an excellent place to commit crimes were left, 
leading to inevitable deterioration. 
8. Relationship Between Probable Maximum Precipitation (PMP) and Area 
R = ID [a + IA ~ C ] ; Fletcher (1950) 
in which: 
R = rainfall depth 
A = area 
D = rainfall duration 
a = the shift of the axl.S of rainfall divided by II) 
b = parameter representing the particular hyperbola 
fit t ing 
C = the shift of the axis of square root of area 
For U.S, rainfalls, FLetcher found the following relationship: 
R=ID[0.5+ 266 IA + 19.2 
where R is in inches; D is in hours; and A is in square miles. 
The above equation is valid for A up to 200,000 square miles. 
Horton (1924) gave the depth area relationship as: 
n 
p = P e-KA 
o 
chosen for the 
84 
in which 
P = the average depth of rainfall for a given duration 
A = area 
Po = the highest amount at the center of the storm 
K,n = constants for a given storm. 
Using storm data of five great northern storms, Horton (1924) found that the 
24-hour rainfall amount could be represented by 
P = 16 -0.0883 AO.
24 
e 
and for five great southern storms by 
-p -0.112 AO.
25 
22 e 
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